Changes required in the Higher Defence Organisation of our country have been subject of constant debate, with many - and diverse - views continuing to be aired. A common denominator seems to be dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. The need to improve on existing templates is a laudable thought, but does it require major surgery? Also, must we be taken in by examples of systems obtained from other countries, or should we seek solutions that are more appropriate to our circumstances? Should we blindly ape what others do or use our genius to fashion systems that are more applicable to our needs? What are the changes that could be introduced to advantage? This article addresses these questions and more, the views expressed being personal, not parochial and based on lifetime experiences of my service in the Indian Air Force.
Before any form of surgery on our defence organisation is countenanced, it is pertinent to pinpoint facts in the prevailing system. We have won all the wars we have fought, sans the 1962 border war, and that is by itself sufficient proof of the soundness of our organisation. If a military organisation is essentially established to prepare the armed forces to win wars, our system has stood the test of time. In 1962, our problem was the lack of intelligence and intent, compounded by inadequate preparation resulting in the Chinese taking us by surprise. Possibly, we were also unsure as how to wage that type of warfare. The fact is that no different manner of higher defence organisation would have turned defeat into victory. It is thus logical to conclude that the wars that we have fought since Independence do not make a case for any major change in our organisation.
However, there certainly are areas of concern that should be addressed. Our procurement system is painfully sluggish and laboured. Jointness amongst our services could be improved, relations and mutual confidence between the services and the Ministry of Defence should improve. Perhaps one possible cause of the present state of affairs is inadequate understanding of the other(s) point of view and, maybe, even some doubt of intentions. However, the solution to bring about improvements stare us starkly in the face. We need greater understanding and appreciation of these differing viewpoints, and we must not ever forget that we are on the same side. To my mind, it is a mental challenge and not an organisational limitation. We can, by clear intent, make the system work much better, which is what we should do.
The ongoing debate on higher defence management largely deals with three issues: the armed forces becoming part of the government and active participants in decision making. Also, for greater understanding to develop, officers from the armed forces should occupy berths in the civilian hierarchy and vice versa. This should be done at both middle and senior levels.
Then, the need for a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a Permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (PCCOSC), with his duties and responsibilities clearly defined. And then of late, the debate whether we should adopt the ‘Theatre Command’ system in India. These issues require rational review as also civil and military interaction.
Civil-Military Interaction
Proposals regarding cross postings appear attractive and have some merit as these will promote better understanding as long as there is mutual desire to cooperate and some personalities do not undermine the system. We have to be selective in determining the berths that such deputationists could occupy. More importantly, it is not desirable for those posted from outside the system to be given decision making responsibilities as they would lack basic knowledge and instinctive understanding of the systems in vogue. The best is that they would provide in-house domain knowledge, which will be of benefit unless the advice rendered is only subjective which could certainly happen. Still, the deputationists may find the ‘work culture’ somewhat alien and will have to get used to a new work ethos on joining the new organisation and, again, when they revert to their parent service. Another drawback is that as the deputationists eventually revert to their parent service, they may choose to air only partial views. The proposal to introduce deputationists has its limitations, but the advantage of ready availability of professional advice has considerable value and should be encouraged, with the personnel cautioned of the pitfalls and guided to overcome these. The great plus point of the proposal is that it can be readily implemented without introducing any major changes and the system can easily be modified - or even abandoned - at will. Another aspect that could be considered is that where ever independent advice from more experienced officers is needed, it may be advisable to elicit the help of recently retired senior officers whose knowledge is still current but who may not always agree with the views of their erstwhile service.
Ultimate Civil-Military interaction is captured in this photo of Prime Minister Narendra Modi with senior armed forces officers and senior bureaucrats on board INS Vikramaditya during a Combined Commanders Conference
Another issue is the advisability of making service officers as part of governance and giving them decision of making responsibilities that are presently the exclusive domain of civil servants. The thought process behind this proposal is that service officers with their professional knowledge will understand various needs better and thereby hasten decision-making processes, particularly in the procurement of hardware. Here, three issues merit examination. Firstly, supposed inefficiencies cannot be overcome by mere change from civilian to service officers manning and even heading berths in the Ministry of Defence. The system in vogue is tried and tested and as improvement progresses, it must remain an ongoing process, as major changes could be counter-productive. Secondly and more importantly, the essential requirement is training for the particular post and continuity in the post and not one who holds it. It is recommended that a high percentage of civil servants in the Ministry of Defence be given sufficient exposure to the armed forces either when they join, say by spending a year or two in armed force units, or whilst in service. This will foster greater understanding of service systems and requirements. Thirdly, and most importantly, conscious efforts should be made to better understand “the other side of the picture” which will foster the belief that all are “on the same side” and working in an individual manner towards a common goal. The tendency to be eschewed is the belief that appointment to a particular post makes for instant expertise. Seeking advice and understanding is not demeaning; in fact, it is a natural necessity.
For better interaction between service and civil functionaries, major changes in the MoD’s organisation may not be warranted, but incremental improvements should be a continuous process. Above all, it must be emphasised that all those involved should recognise that an organisation cannot function better than the capabilities of the people manning it.
Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)
It is obvious that the terms ‘CDS’ and ‘PCCOSC’ Permanent Chairman Chief of Staff Committee are interchangeable and imply that both designations will carry similar responsibilities. The CDS will be supported by the existing Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and the extant duties of IDS will devolve on the CDS. The suggested duties of the CDS will broadly include such responsibilities as being the single-point of contact for military advice on matters military and administering the Strategic Force Command (SFC). Whenever other Tri-service commands such as Special Operations Command, Cyber Command or Space Command are established, the Commanders of all these Commands will report to the CDS. Besides, the CDS and his staff would ensure greater efficiency and effectiveness in the planning process including procurement and operational planning. Fostering greater jointness amongst the services would also be his responsibility.
As per existing norms, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) report to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) as do the Commander SFC and the Tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command. One difference is that unlike the proposed CDS, the Chairman COSC would not be designated as the single point of contact on military matters. The Chairman is also a rotational appointment and rapid changes have occurred in the past, such changes having been viewed by some as militating against the minimum desired tenure to permit continuity. However, it is argued that the system has been operating for many years and the very experienced Chairman COSC, backed by many three and two-star officers and a considerable staff that comprise the IDS, should not have any difficulty to undertake additional responsibilities. Hence, it is opined that the current system should be left unchanged for the present. As and when new tri-service commands are established, the institution of a Permanent Chairman makes sense as he would then be required to oversee and control functioning of the tri-service commands to meet the needs of all three services. The Chairman COSC may find the workload of overseeing the work of three or four additional commands whilst retaining the responsibilities of his parent service as excessive. The question whether the task of PCCOSC should also include the responsibilities mentioned above needs to be addressed.
CDS as single point for Military Advice
On the face of it, seeking professional advice from a single source on all military issues appears to presume existence of one person with inherent super human powers of indepth understanding of all issues concerning the armed forces. This is beyond what can be expected of a mere mortal! The concept is flawed as we are in an age of specialisation and even super specialisation, and whilst generalists have their place, it will always be prudent to seek advice from those best qualified to provide this, particularly so in case of operational plans which holds true too for recommending defence equipment procurements. Of course, corporate decision making has many advantages. A single individual cannot be contacted in every case. If the manner of single source for advice is adopted, the CDS would often have to seek professional guidance from others. His recommendations would be based on secondhand information and if a discussion ensues or supplementary issues arise, the CDS will be hard pressed to make the best views available. It should also be recognised that, in the absence of adequate data, which is often the case, one has to rely on intuition which is itself the result of first hand experience. There is no substitute for experience. Be that as it may, it is also more than likely that views of the CDS would be biased perhaps even unintentionally. We can and should do better. Each Service has its core competencies, a fact to be accepted by all. Within each Service there are sub specialisations and in each case, there will probably be more than one expert. Even the head of a particular service often seeks the views of more than one individual, discusses the pros and cons of differing thoughts before arriving at a plan or a recommended course of action. If this obtains in a single service environment, the situation would be far more complex in inter Service considerations.
Another issue merits consideration. The CDS would obviously be from one of the three Services and it is inadvisable to make him responsible for the conduct of operations, which should remain in the realm of individual services. This cannot be over emphasised. The CDS would seek views from heads of the three Services and he would naturally be more agreeable and amenable to advice from those NOT of his parent service. Differences of opinion could arise where his thinking is considerably different from that of the head of his own parent service. A piquant situation could certainly then arise, one which must be avoided. The concept of the CDS providing a single point of advice should be considered as being “still born”.
Agni V strategic ballistic missile during a Republic Day parade in New Delhi
Strategic Force Command
The Strategic Force Command draws support from all three Services but there is also need for administrative control and administrative support to the Command. As it would be somewhat problematic for the Commander SFC to deal with all three heads of the Services, his reporting to the Chairman COSC or CDS or PCCOSC stands to reason. However, it is a moot point as to whether any form of operational control should be exercised by Chairman COSC. In our system, for very good reasons, we have clear separation between the control and conduct of conventional operations on one hand and the preparation, God forbid, for a nuclear war on the other. It is imperative that the separation be maintained. The two are very distinct levels of conflict and must be dealt with separately. We must shun the thought that use of a nuclear weapon is a possible extension of conventional military conflict. In our scenario, the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of such weapons against us, which must remain the cardinal principle. Again, for good reasons, all security attached to matters nuclear must be of a decidedly higher order and we should do whatever possible to ensure that the systems we adopt are such that no classified information is compromised even inadvertently. Hence it is strongly recommended that the operational control of Commander SFC should be exercised by either the National Security Adviser or the Executive Council of the National Command Authority. In fact it would be advisable if Commander SFC is invited to become part of the Executive Council.
Efficacy of the Planning Process
The IDS was intended to form the staff of the CDS, but even without a CDS, the IDS reports to the Chairman COSC and it has been so some 16 years since the IDS was created (October 2001). By now the teething problems should really have been over and the organisation well-honed to oversee inter service issues. However, and unfortunately, the organisation has morphed into an entity by itself instead of using the great expertise posted to it to iron out inter service differences. The greatest contribution that IDS can now make is to find solutions to vexing problems that will be acceptable to all. They must also help find common ground when there are serious differences of opinion, which has largely eluded us.
The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) of the IDS has done good work in providing Joint Intelligence Assessments. It is now a respected organisation. The IDS has also been successful in finalising a ‘Defence Space Vision’. Many Joint Committees have been created for better functional efficiency. Some air defence issues have found solutions. A Joint Doctrine for the Services has also been released. All these are not seriously contentious issues. For instance, the doctrine does not carry a high security grading and must be guarded in its approach. If a doctrine is defined as a set of beliefs, it has little value in formulating either procurement or operational plans. At best it can lay down broad concepts and basic principles on the conduct of operations. But, is a doctrine always implementable? The answer is possibly in the negative. No doctrine can cater to varied contingences and can never be a diktat on how to wage wars. Security considerations will prohibit this. Again, the release of a Joint Doctrine does not automatically imply that it is a stepping stone to establishment of the CDS and/or of Theatre Commands. At best, finalising a Joint Doctrine is a small step and, maybe, it shows that on issues that do not pertain to procurement or operations, unanimity of views of the three services can be obtained even if it is time consuming. All the same, there is an element of inadequacy in it.
Air Defence of the country is prime task and responsibility of the Indian Air Force. Seen here is a MiG-29 at a forward operational air base
The major task of the IDS should be to fashion and control the procurement system and to formulate operational plans. Over the years, the IDS has worked hardto streamline the procurement process, has introduced checks and procedures to ensure that the Defence Procurement Procedure is adhered to. On many occasions, it has made sure that a common approach and recommendations are presented to the Defence Acquisition Council. Some good work has also been done towards finding commonality in equipment purchases and in making a single approach to the vendors. As a positive fallout, independent approaches by different services for the same equipment, as has often happened in the past should not occur again.
The Boeing AH-64 Apache attack helicopter was ordered by the Indian Air Force several years back and of late, also by the Indian Army. This is prime example of a muddle in doctrines and careless directions from the political level (see article in this Issue)
Still, the IDS does little to formulate the requirements of the Services. The Long Term Perspective Plans of the Army, Navy, Air Force are worked out by the individual service supposedly on the basis of Net Assessments prepared by the concerned Directorate in IDS and the plans forwarded to the IDS. The IDS merely collates these and produces a document titled the Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), intended to be a joint plan on the basis of which purchase proposals can be readied. As it is, the IDS does not examine whether the proposals in the individual plans are indeed based on net assessments, nor in the integrated plan are there any recommendations made on prioritisation of purchases. There is little application of mind. Different views are not sought and thereafter examined to arrive at concrete and studied recommendations that can be defended. There is little examination as to whether the purchases sought by different services are conducive to joint operational plans. In this way, the authority of the services is not undermined, but the LTIPP can hardly be called a joint plan.
The major limitation in this system is that a joint procurement plan cannot be made on the basis of individual appreciations of what the net assessment forecasts. The starting point has to be joint planning. A systematic approach towards this end is needed. It is recommended that each Service is tasked to work out, in cogent terms, its capabilities whilst operating on its own and in conjunction with the other service(s). This really must be the first step. Thereafter joint planning should be carried out for the contingencies that flow out of the net assessment or any other contingency. Such joint planning should carry the commitment of each service that they will be able to effect what they say they can. That will make the planning more meaningful as there will be an inherent if quasi guarantee of success. The implicit understanding should be that if it becomes necessary to put the plans into practice, no service will make excuses for performance qualitatively short of what was projected earlier as its capabilities. Accountability must be ensured and planning will thus be more realistic. More importantly, it will be a joint plan and point the way towards training requirements. Of course, this will be an involved process and a continuous one but the results will be worthwhile. The plans will automatically throw up immediate procurement needs and prioritisation of procurements in the years ahead. Most importantly, the operational plans and subsequently arrived at procurement plans will have the concurrence of all three services. If we are to attenuate inter service rivalry, the start should be with operational planning that is based on reality rather than imagined capabilities and requirements. Good jointness will be a byproduct that will strengthen with time. Joint formulation of strategy and tactics and the consequent operational planning cannot but foster better understanding - and better jointness.
The IAF’s fleet of C-130 Super Hercules are essentially employed for insertion of Army Special Forces in critical areas (photo: Angad Singh)
Some could argue that the procedure suggested is much too simplistic while warfare is far more complex. The author wholeheartedly agrees. For security reasons, details have been omitted. Also, as the system is fielded and begins to operate, improvements will suggest themselves. The planning system is an evolutionary process, but it bears mention that everyone accepts that joint planning is a pre-requisite for effective prosecution of a modern war and progressive modernisation is essential. The procedure outlined earlier meets both requirements. A logical approach has been recommended: first plan and let the planning process determine on procurement priorities. It must be again emphasised that the planning process has to be complex, dynamic and continual. Security aspects of joint prosecutors of plans, each Service carrying out the assigned role, can be handled without any hassles. Security considerations will arise, but as the planning is carried out jointly and the prosecution of plans devolved to individual services, the security issue can be contained. Again as there will probably be many plans and sub plans for each contingency, security is strengthened as the choice of plan to adopt will be taken at the last moment. A full time planning team is needed and the work of this team will be as important during peace as during war.
The procedure outlined above has not been attempted so far and is likely to face strong resistance. Possibly a Governmental push may be required. It has often been mooted that a Government push is needed to introduce changes in Higher Defence Organisation, but the author argues that a push towards joint planning will work better. Not only planning for possible wars and how to prosecute them is the raison d’etre of the armed forces, but also the plans generated and the manner in which the wars should be fought will automatically present the most suitable and optimum organisation. Such a study will be based on inputs that are more germane to the armed forces and are as realistic as possible, as opposed to expressions of imaginary needs and fears. And then perhaps too, no real changes will be required!
When the IDS was created some 16 years ago, it was hoped that better inter-Service cooperation would be achieved. Unfortunately that has not happened. Turf battles continue even within the IDS. Considering that even after so many years of its existence and a manning level of some 300 officers drawn from all three services, headed by an officer of Vice Chief status supported by 5 officers of three star PSO status and 24 two star officers, the IDS remains riddled with many shortcomings as mentioned above. Possibly the problem is neither administrative nor organisational? Apparently, the indispensability of jointness needs to be re-considered.
Jointmanship in action : Indian Air Force Il-78MKI flight refuels Indian Navy Sea Harriers (since phased out) with MiG-29K in the foreground
Jointness in the Armed Forces
Innumerable articles have been written - and discussions held-on the lack of jointness in the armed forces and the overriding need to institutionlise this. Unfortunately, jointness has different connotations for different people. Remedies abound but jointness has remained elusive. It was always thought that with premier institutions like the National Defence Academy, Defence Services Staff College and the other inter service organisations, greater understanding would occur and jointness would automatically follow. Such optimistic thoughts have been belied. We have been unable to get rid of ‘turf war’s in spite of the fact that greater bonhomie amongst the services has been brought about by joint training institutions, but real jointness is a long way off.
Of course, there have been occasions when the Services have been in agreement and put up joint recommendations, but essentially these relate to administrative issues like pay commission awards and the like.
The history of conflicts since India’s Independence shows that the level of cooperation should really have been much better. For example, in the Kashmir War of 1947-48, despite the Prime Minister’s advice to the Army Chief the on the importance of Skardu, his air counterpart was not informed and this delayed in supplies being air-dropped to the besieged and beleaguered garrison. The result was surrender and the consequent massacre of the garrison. In 1962, while the Government did not permit use of combat air power which had been deployed and was fully ready for any contingency, the phenomenal and back-breaking effort by the air transport fleet was wasted owing to poor selection of dropping zones especially at Longju and Tangdhar. Their unsuitability was conveyed by the AOC in-C to the Corps Commander but the former was over-ruled.
Seen at a fire power demonstration in the Pokhran ranges are senior officers of the Indian Navy and Air Force (including the then C-in-C Strategic Forces Command)
There was little joint planning before and during the 1965 Indo-Pak War. The IAF leadership was not aware of the Army’s plan and could not mesh its plan with that of the Army. Possibly, this resulted in fizzling out of the rapid advance by the Army in the Lahore sector on 6 September 1965. The air effort was available for supporting the land forces, but the demands were either not raised or were rejected by the JAAOCs. This resulted in under utilisation of aircraft to around one sortie per aircraft per day against a planning figure and availability of 3 sorties, per aircraft, per day.
Similarly, in 1987, during the Jaffna University heli-drop soon after induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) into Sri Lanka was a disaster and resulted in very heavy and avoidable casualties mainly because of the lack of joint planning. The situation remarkably changed after the setting up of HQ IPKF at Madras and of an Air Force Cell therein.
All this is very regrettable as one should have expected that lessons were learnt after every conflict and cooperation would progressively improve. Some improvements did take place as in the case of the 1971 War and Kargil 1999, but, largely, an unsatisfactory situation continues to prevail. This is in spite of the IDS experiment, spread over 16 years and also the setting up of the Unified Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC).
Mi-8 and Mi-17 of the IAF demonstrating heli-drop of commandos
Three issues militate against better jointness amongst the services. Firstly, there is lack of adequate understanding of the operational thinking, strengths and limitations of the other services. This is particularly true on awareness about Air Force capabilities, which are not that well appreciated and hence expectations are not realistic. What makes matters worse is that air power is inherently difficult to comprehend. When the Air Force reports that it is unable to perform a task, this is sometimes mistaken as the Air Force not wanting to do so. It is a fact that the Air Force has always come forward to support the Army or Navy but at times this is not appreciated. On the other hand, the ubiquitous nature of air power per se is understood and there is clamour for an ‘Air Force’ as part of every Service! This goes against the basic principle in the utilisation of air power: the unity of command. Jointness will remain elusive unless such cardinal issues are fully understood.
Secondly, in spite of so many years of seeking jointness, the roles and missions of individual Services have not been defined and core competencies not yet been stipulated. This must be done immediately, an essential pre-requisite. Three independent Services have been created because they have different attributes and core competencies. In the absence of stipulations of core competencies and defined roles, attempts to encroach upon one another’s domain will continue. Such attempts, often without informing the concerned service, cannot but create bad blood akin to poaching on the territory of a sister service. ‘Must guard one’s turf’ has become the refrain. Once again, it is the Air Force that bears the major brunt of ‘attempted encroachment’. Once the core competencies and roles and missions of each service are well defined and enforced, hopefully by a governmental fiat, ‘attempted encroachments’ should cease. In view of the author, a Governmental order stipulating the core competencies and roles and missions of each service will be the single most important remedy to bring about jointness. With better jointness, better cooperation and coordination will follow.
Long range strike component of the Indian Air Force includes these Jaguars
Thirdly, by its very nature, air power has a vital role to play, often the decisive role, in all types of operations. As a result, this dimension is much in demand, but the Service that needs air power most often enough does not recognise that the Air Force’s capability is finite. It could happen that at times air effort is not available to the required extent, for which there can be many reasons: availability, weather, need for prioritisation of available effort, and so on. This lacuna is particularly germane to the IAF. However, this is not so well appreciated and bad blood is created. Worse, there is that clamour for air power under one’s own command. What is not recognised is that if air assets sought by another service are made available to the Air Force, better availability and utilisation will result as flying operations are without doubt core competency of the Air Force. With duplication, command and control issues and air space management issues raise their nefarious head and could then cause many more disagreements.
Mirage 2000TH of the Indian Air Force over the high Himalayas
Possibly a fourth factor is the desire to have all support functions under one’s own command. It is but obvious that such an approach is not conducive to enhanced jointness. Implicit in the four factors as described is the remedy to right the wrongs. One issue that will probably transcend all others to bring about jointness is joint planning. The basis of joint planning has to be recognition of core competencies and understanding of roles and missions of each service. Again, this factor cannot be reiterated or re-emphasised often enough. Joint planning will also bring to light the availability of resources and an understanding of how and why the ‘poverty’ should be shared. It is obviously a foregone conclusion that we must fight together. Some 15 years ago the author had opined that far more important than planning for joint operations is joint planning for operations. This is not verbal jugglery but an important factor. The author still stands by this and argues that joint planning is the single most important aspect for inter service cooperation. In some circumstances, a single service operation is the best option, indeed a valid operation of war as long as it is the result of joint planning. Continuous joint planning will bring about meaningful jointness.
True flexibility of Air Power is the ability to switch forces from one theatre to the other in sub-continental terms
The rationale–or otherwise–of Theatre Commands
There were two occasions in independent India where a Unified Command system was adopted, the first during the IPKF operations in 1987. In the very early days, the Army Commander elected to task the Air Force for a helicopter drop of Army personnel at Jaffna University. The Air Force element was against it as, “far too risky,” but were overruled. In this operation, all helicopters were damaged and tragically a large number of lives were lost. Almost immediately thereafter, an Air Component Commander was positioned to take charge of deployment and for tasking of air assets. The Air Force continued to support operations over the next two years but under the control of the Air Commander. The ‘Unified Command System’ was a failure and was discontinued.
Amphibious assault exercise in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands
Now on establishment of the Unified Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), set up in October 2001. One of the objectives was also to establish the viability of a Theatre Command, but the experience of its functioning over the last 16 years does not give much confidence that a Theatre Command system will really be of benefit.
This Unified Command has not succeeded in fostering jointness and reportedly, inter service rivalry is as strong as ever before. Personnel of each service have to follow the rules of the parent service even if they are markedly different from those of the Service. Commonality has not been ensured.
Authority of the Commander-in-Chief is undermined in that he can try disciplinary cases only of personnel of his parent Service. The personnel of the other services would be tried by a more senior officer of that Service in the Command but if the case has to be referred to someone senior, it goes to respective Service HQs. Such a situation is not conducive to good discipline. There is no combined maintenance organisation and each service keeps its own. A common communication system does not exist. Service HQs, possibly perforce, have to deal with the Component Commanders directly bypassing the HQs of the Command. Land continues to be controlled by the parent service and permission has to be sought from the HQs of the Service concerned for any planned utilisation, with permission being granted seldom.
However, the major lacuna is in the operational arena. The Command has a clearly stipulated task but little means to meet the requirement. The forces deployed are meagre and it is a moot point if the augmentation of forces, in terms of how many and when they can be expected, is inadequate. The C-in-C does not have enough forces under his command to plan and conduct operational exercises and test the mettle of his personnel: one wonders how the Command will fare in war! Such ‘poverty sharing’ will be a regular feature if other Theatre Commands are introduced. It will be difficult to carry out meaningful training and operational planning with many such commands.
It is recommended that such form of Unified Command be disbanded and we revert to the earlier system of placing forces under the concerned geographical commands. In this way, geographical commands will just have additional responsibilities but will retain the freedom to work out contingency planning and training schedules as substantially greater force levels will be available. If even after 16 years, there are such drawbacks in the functioning of this Command, it behoves us to reconsider the setting up of a Unified ANC and to seek other solutions.
Trio of Sukhoi Su-30MKIs carrying out retarded bomb attack during a fire power demonstration
Any organisation or proposed organisation should be based on perceived needs. It is generally accepted that whilst we must prepare for a major war to create a deterrent capability, the types of conflicts in the near future are likely to be of short duration or even near continuous, event-based, low-level, sub-conventional operations. For such a contingency a mammoth organisation like the Theatre Command is a gross overkill.
Conventional wisdom suggests that if a major war were to break out today, it would be sharp, intense and last for some 15 days or so. In such wars, air power will
have a defining role. Such wars demand concentration of air power at different locations at different times for different roles. The radii of action of modern day aircraft can be as much as 1500-2000 kms or more. This requires the ability, and maybe the need, to hit targets at long distances rapidly and repeatedly, and also the ability to hit targets in the operational area of responsibility of more than one Command. The aircraft will probably have to transcend geographical zones of other Commands. Deployment of aircraft may have to be changed repeatedly, from one sector to another, depending on progress of the operations. History records as to how all this and more was done in previous conflicts, even when our capability was nowhere near as strong as it is today. The situation becomes more complex if we take into consideration the actions carried out by the adversary. Air defence and offensive operations have to be conducted with effective synergy.
All this leads to the irrefutable conclusion that air operations are markedly different from those of the other two services in terms of expanse of areas of interest and rapidity with which operations can be mounted. Strategic agility is a byword for air power. Unity of Command with devolution of control is an essential characteristic for effective use of air power and this must be respected.
The preceding elaboration of the nature and characteristics of airpower should not give the impression that the Air Force will fight its own war. Far from it. It needs to be emphatically reiterated that joint planning is the name of the game. The Joint Plan will include the aforementioned tasks for the Air Force but not preclude other tasks. A Theatre Command system will introduce one more level in the control of air power and place a spanner in its flexibility, that of the service which has most to offer. Most importantly, piecemeal use of air power has never yielded good results. This is particularly true when the forces available are less than what is required. There have been occasions in the past when the control and tasking of particular aircraft in short supply was carried out directly by Air HQ. There can be other reasons too when Air HQ will elect to exercise direct control over designated forces.
The unmistakable conclusion therefore is that a Theatre Command system will serve no useful purpose but would only impede and atrophy the capability and potential of air power, particularly in our context.
In conclusion, the author finds no justification for introducing either a CDS or Theatre Command. Indeed the argument is contra-indicated. The essential need is for better joint planning that may have to be enforced by the Government. At the same time, a cardinal requirement is that the Government must take it upon itself to stipulate the core competencies and roles and missions of the three services.
There are so many other issues demanding attention of the Government and the Armed Forces. Modernisation requirements are urgent as is the need to have clear policies on space, cyber-space, special forces etc. These are weighty issues that should be addressed on topmost priority. Unnecessary impediments and roadblocks like discussions and polemics on CDS/Theatre Commands should be abandoned once and for all. We need improvements in our Higher Defence Organisation, and not going off on tangents.
This
article has appeared in ‘Air Power’ quarterly journal of the ‘Centre for Air
Power Studies’ of which Air Marshal Vinod Patney SYSM PVSM AVSM VrC (retd) is
Director General.