Sameer Joshi analyses the air combat over Kashmir
Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman of the Indian Air Force’s No.51 Squadron flying a MiG-21 Bison, made aviation history around 10.00 hrs on 27 February 2019, when he targeted a formations of Pakistan Air Force F-16s who were engaging IAF Sukhoi Su-30MKI fighters with their AIM-120 AMRAAM beyond visual range missiles. Closing in, he launched a Vympel R-73 heat seeking air-to-air missile at the target over the Lam valley in Nowshera sub sector of south western Jammu and Kashmir, which resulted in the shooting down of a PAF F-16. This was vigorously denied by Pakistani spokespersons, but this brief air combat has since been reported and analysed ad infinitum well beyond the sub-continent, with claims and denials continuing till today.
What is undeniable is that Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was also hit by an AMRAAM missile as he was heading back towards India, having crossed the LOC in pursuit of the F-16 just tens of seconds earlier. He ejected from the stricken aircraft and parachuted to safety, landing 4 km away from the LOC near Horan Kotla village in POK. He was brutally attacked by some locals, before being dramatically handed over to the Pakistan Army.
Abhi’s ordeal made him focal point of the developing crisis, when in gross violation of the Geneva convention, the footage of his battered face was intentionally released on Pakistani television and social media by Pakistan Army affiliates shortly thereafter.
Pak Army troops next to the fallen IAF MiG-21bison in POK
Just after Abhinandan’s ejection on 27 February, the Indian Air Force first reported through the ANI’s Twitter handle that they had shot down a F-16 over the Lam valley and also acknowledged the loss of one of its MiG-21s. At the same time, Major General Asif Ghafoor, Director-General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) and chief spokesperson of Pakistan Armed Forces, tweeted on the ISPR handle that two Indian jets had been shot down by the PAF in POK, with one pilot arrested by the Pak army and two still in the area. Even as facts were being ascertained and before the IAF could give any info, Pakistani handles on social media started talking about the shooting down of two IAF jets and capture of their Indian pilots.
While addressing a press conference at noon, an hour or so after his first significant tweet, Maj Gen Ghafoor said that another pilot has been arrested. “Our ground forces arrested two pilots; one of them was injured and has been shifted to CMH (Combined Military hospital) and, God-willing, he will be taken care of,” said the army official and reiterated that “The other one is with us.” Maj Gen Ghafoor also assured all that no F-16 of the PAF had been shot down, since the F-16s were ‘not’ used in combat in that sector at all. Interestingly, the Pak PM Imran Khan also stated that Pakistan had two Indian pilots in custody. Post that press conference, the ISPR chief informed that the pilot in their custody in the military hospital had passed away. At 6:19 PM in the evening, the last tweet on the subject from Maj Gen Ghafoor clarified that the Pak Army had just ‘one’ IAF pilot in its custody, who was Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman.
During the time between his first and last tweet, the social media, particularly on Twitter, spiked up with a virtual war between Indian and Pakistani tweeter posting a barrage of messages, videos and photos to bolster their claims, nudged by the ISPR showing the travails of Abhinandan Varthaman as their POW, in a clear effort to shift the focus of attention away from the shooting down of a PAF F-16 and fate of the other downed pilot.
Electromagnetic Evidence on the Air Situation
Let us take a look at the OSINT info and the evidence that the Indian Air Force has officially revealed on the shooting down of the PAF F-16. That F-16s had engaged with the IAF near Poonch-Naoshera sub sector on 27 February has been proven beyond doubt by the electronic signatures, as well as various video and visual sightings from both sides of the Line of Control.
The IAF’s A.50 Phalcon AWACS, which while not on station and not controlling the IAF vs PAF air situation, had adequate radar pick up on the aerial engagement unfolding via its powerful airborne AESA radar. In addition, the Phalcon was able to map the large force engagement (LFE) from 10,000 to 40,000 feet, distinguishing and identifying the various PAF fighters taking part through their electromagnetic emissions (radars, navigational equipment and other active sensors), duly picked up, processed and analysed by the powerful Electronic Intelligence (Elint) systems. It identified F-16, JF-17 and Mirage 5s as part of the PAF package, spread out from north to south J&K on three main axes near the Line of Control in the POK.
The lead image shows the fused radar and Elint signatures accurately depicting the presence in time and space of the F-16’s APG-68 V9 radar signature over Lam valley, along with 4 different blips between 10–15,000 feet. The data proves beyond doubt that F-16s were operating against the IAF that morning, further confirmed by the remains of the AMRAAM missile found in Naoshera sector by the Indian military (in image below).
The IAF’s PRO and his team displaying part of an AMRAAM missile fired by PAF F-16s against IAF Su-30MKIs on 27 February 2019.
The IAF’s Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS) had initially missed tracking the ingress of these four F-16s towards the LOC since they maintained below the radar horizon of the IAF’s ground based radars, picking them only once they approached north of Poonch, where they lay in wait to ambush IAF Su-30MKIs who were being ‘pushed’ towards them by another formation of 4 F-16s north west of Poonch at 40,000 feet. This formation had fired 4–5 AMRAAM missiles at IAF Su-30 MKIs, as they approached south of Rajouri.
Having identified the lower formation of F-16s and seeing that the Su-30MKIs were effectively being checked by the higher formation of F-16s, the IACCS vectored two MiG-21 Bisons to prevent these 4 F-16s from breaking through towards Srinagar-Awantipore. Wg Cdr Abhinandan was the lead in this two aircraft MiG-21 pair, the approach of which was missed by the F-16s who were busy scanning for the Su-30MKIs, but reportedly a Saab 2000 ERIEYE Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) operating in depth near Islamabad, tracked the MiG-21s over Naoshera, warning the F-16s. The IAF’s ground controller saw the defensive maneuvering of the F-16s, warning the MiGs in turn. While his No 2, who was lagging behind, turned ‘cold’ or away from the F-16s which were going ‘hot’ or facing the MiGs, Abhinandan chose to ignore this threat and continued towards the F-16s.
Both the IACCS and Phalcon AWACS registered the radar signature of one MiG-21 cross the Line of Control and engage a F-16 with a R-73 missile. Abhinandan’s call on R/T of a missile launch was monitored by the AWACS, being 8–10 km away from the F-16, which was turning towards him, aiming for a frontal aspect launch with high closing speed between the missile and the incoming F-16. The R-73 is a heat seeking air-to-air missile with a sensitive, dual band cryogenic cooled seeker with a substantial off-boresight capability. The seeker can see targets up to 40° off the missile’s centreline. Minimum engagement range is about 300 meters, with maximum aerodynamic range of nearly 30 km at altitude.
The IAF Phalcon AWACS Air situation Snapshot
Abhinandan fired his R-73 well within the range and tracking capabilities of the R-73 missile, with a high closing speed of more than 3500 kmph between the missile and the F-16, which was at 15,000 feet. At those ranges, the missile would have closed into the target in less than 20 seconds, its proximity fuse activating the 7.4 kg warhead to explode and engulf the F-16 in frontal quarters with flame and high velocity shrapnel, in all probability grievously injuring the pilot. The ‘splashed’ F-16 fell towards the earth post that, with the pilot ejecting out of the stricken aircraft as reported by eyewitnesses.
The F-16 ‘kill’ was recorded by the Phalcon’s radar, with the said blip vanishing from the radar scope in the radar picture processed 8 seconds after the previous one, which had shown the blip in place. This is the first hard evidence on the F-16 kill based on a concrete electronic signature recordings. The same is corroborated by a Thales GS-100 Low Level Targeting Radar (LLTR) deployed in that area and integrated into the IACCS. The GS-100 is an AESA radar with low-altitude search capability that can track targets up to 180 km range with high accuracy. The post event milking out of radar data from the GS-100 clearly has shown the MiG-21 closing into the F-16s, which were higher between 15–25,00 feet.
The overlapping time and place of the missile launch and the subsequent ‘splash’ with the blip vanishing is registered very accurately, matching with the Phalcon data. This is the second hard evidence on the F-16 kill.
The same LLTR had clearly registered a PAF F-16 manoeuvering towards Abhinandan’s MiG-21, as he turned northwards post his missile launch. Guided by the Saab ERIEYE, it was a classic Type III converting into a Type IV interception by the F-16 which fired an AMRAAM to shoot down the IAF MiG-21. The LLTR noticed the MiG-21 blip vanishing after nearly a minute post the F-16 kill, matching with the account from Abhinandan’s debrief after his repatriation back to India.
Visual Sighting
Actually, the air battle was visible in great detail, on both sides of the Line of Control in J&K, thanks to the contrails formed at the altitudes where the jets were operating on most occasions.
The ensuing air combat as viewed from the Pakistani side of line of control
As the F-16 fell to the ground after being hit by the MiG-21, its downward trajectory with parachutes in proximity, was recorded by at least 2 different geographically apart Indian Army posts, which accurately estimated that the wreckage would have fallen 7–8 km in POK close to Sabzkot in Bhimber. About 40–50 seconds later, the same army posts noticed and tracked Abhinandan’s MiG-21 going down and his ejection in general area Tandar 6–7 km inside POK, which through OSINT is close to the village of Horan Kotla where the wreckage was seen vividly on social media.
The sightings and the time of the aircraft (and parachutes), match up with the electronic signatures from both the AWACS and the LLTR. This is irrefutable proof of the F-16 being shot down by the MiG-21. Post this, radio transmission picked up by the Indian military around 1145H shows Pakistan soldiers from Northern Light Infantry talking about two ‘parinda‘ (aircraft) and two ‘parinde wale‘ (pilots), having bagged one in their custody. While the first parachute was seen in General Area Sabzkot, the second parachute was spotted in General Area Tandar. The distance between the two locations of the F-16 and MiG-21 wreckage is about 6–7 kms.
Indian Army sightings of two different aircraft crashing released by the IAF
In an intercept at 1242H, a soldier of 7 Northern Light Infantry, Tandar area, mentions soldiers from 658 Mujahid battalion having picked up a second pilot, which was Abhinandan as seen with the Mujahid soldiers in the various social media grabs. The NLI soldiers already had one pilot in custody at the time : at 1520 hours, another intercept says that “while one pilot is in custody, another has been sent to the military hospital”.
This clearly shows that a second pilot was also in the Pak Army custody as also being mentioned in the parralel narrative by the ISPR chief. So if one was Abhinandan with the Mujahids, who was the second pilot with the NLI battalion — obviously none other than the F-16 pilot ?
Besides the initial video of locals who said two pilots were caught, the sighting by the Indian army and videos showing two parachutes coming down, all indicate that a Pakistan jet was shot down.
A case of two wreckages and three parachutes: OSINT data analysis
After sifting through a large volume of social media videos, images and posts, some very interesting OSINT data emerges. With over 10 different videos of the aerial engagement and the subsequent aircraft crashing into the ground accessed, there are at least two videos which show two different aircraft falling towards the ground. These can be distinguished by their rapidly falling trajectories towards the ground and the vapour trails created in the skies. Clearly two different aircraft had crashed in the Bhimber area of POK on 27 February.
A detailed analysis of Abhinandan’s crash site by geospatial experts and eyewitness accounts places it near the village of Horan Kotla in Tandar area. Working backwards from the location of the MiG-21 wreckage, one can plot the approximate area where the F-16 wreckage might have fallen.
After the tirade of videos on the MiG-21 wreckage surfacing on the social media, there was an initial rush to brand the MiG-21's R-25 engine, as seen in the wreckage as the F-16’s General Electric Engine. However, it petered down when experts stepped in to debunk these theories.
In all probability, just like they tried to lynch Abhinandan when he landed, the POK locals clearly mistook the F-16 parachute to be Indian and lynched the possibly injured PAF pilot. Owing to extreme injuries, the PAF pilot would have been taken to the Pak Army CMH where he would have passed away due to the wounds sustained. Eyewitness accounts from POK civilians also confirm that the second pilot was taken to a Pak army hospital.
So why didn’t the Pakistanis recognise their own pilot before lynching him? For this we need to go back to the exact moment when Abhinandan fired his R-73 against the PAF F-16. As per Abhinandan’s debrief after his return, the R-73 missile was fired when the PAF aircraft was turning towards the IAF MiG-21, about to roll out towards him in its frontal quarter. This means when the R-73 missile, with a massive closing speed of over 3500 kmph, would have reached the calculated range for its proximity fuse to explode the warhead, the PAF jet would be still be travelling towards the explosion.
Let us try to understand how the R-73 warhead would have exploded : The R-73 has a continuous rod warhead weighing 7.4 kg which is activated by a proximity fuse when it senses an aircraft in close quarters. When detonated, the high explosive imparts momentum to the rods, thrusting them outward in an expanding circle. The pressure wave from the explosive acts evenly on the rods over their length. The rods are sufficiently soft to allow the expansion without breaking the rods or the welded joints, and the detonation velocity is limited to approx. 1000 m/s, allowing the rods to bend at these locations instead. At some intermediate point the ring will have a zig-zag (alternating direction) appearance within a cylindrical envelope. Upon ultimate expansion the ring is circular and contained within a plane.
This rapidly expanding ring, when hitting the aircraft, is more effective than an equivalent fragmentation warhead the ring’s effectiveness decreasing as 1/R, rather than 1/R2 for fragments.
Portions of the aircraft intercepted by the expanding ring of the continuous rod warhead will receive a continuous cut through the skin, light structure, underlying cables, hydraulic lines, and other plumbing if present. This may cause a structural failure, or, if not, can be sufficient for defeating the redundancy of aircraft systems. The effect is only pronounced as long as the ring is unbroken, so multiple layers of rods are employed in practical weapons to increase the effective radius.
Now when the R-73’s warhead would have exploded and expanded ‘outwards’ ‘towards’ the front at over 1000 m/s, the closing speed of over 3500 kmph would have ensured that the F-16 itself would be coming towards the explosion at 972 m/s. So if we assume that the proximity fuse would have initiated the explosion in frontal quarters at around 300m , there would hardly be any time between the effect of the explosion taking shape, expanding the flame and shrapnel at high velocity outwards; and the closing in F-16 to absorb the explosion effectively. What that means is that most of the frontal section of the F-16 would have flown in through the expanding shockwave, with damage mostly limited due to shrapnel, rather than the explosive effect.
Hence the pilot would have survived the heat and flame effects of the explosion, but would have in all probability been effected by the shrapnel effect of the explosion , grievously injuring his upper body , with the flying helmet preventing fatal injuries, but not able to prevent rampant injuries to the face, neck and chest level.
In contrast, the AMRAAM hit on Abhinandan’s MiG-21 was from right 7 ‘o’ clock position, mostly damaging the rear portion of the MiG-21, as is visible during the post-crash analysis of the wreckage.
Hence when the PAF F-16 pilot ejected, he would in all probability have been injured in the upper torso and facial region. He may or may not have been conscious due to his injuries. After his landing in Sabzkot, the POK civilians may not have found the classic traces of PAF flight overalls and livery/ patches, which would have in all probability been ripped off due the high velocity shrapnel —and may not have displayed any name indicating he was a Pakistani because of bloodied appearance. They would not have recognised him as a PAF pilot and assessing from the Indian coloured parachute would have mobbed him like Abhinandan, before being handed over to the NLI soldiers injured, and battered.
Though circumstantial, this relevant evidence proves that a Pakistani pilot was apprehended and injured by a mob after landing and would later have been taken to a Military hospital; where he may have succumbed to his injuries as claimed by the ISPR.
Interestingly, post the aerial melee over South Western J&K on 27 February, the Pakistani Foreign Minister on 6 March spoke in the parliament about two PAF pilots who had shot down IAF aircraft. These pilots were Squadron Leader Hassan Siddiqui and Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan. His statement needs to be analysed objectively for the message it conveys . The FM said when interacting with the other members, “One clarification — Bilawal paid tribute to Hassan Siddiqui as he’s absolutely a national hero, But I would like to clarify that two Indian planes were shot down. The other one was shot down by Wg Cdr Nauman Ali Khan,” he added, asking that the second pilot also be given due credit.”
Why did Bilal Bhutto and other parliamentarians praise the younger Sqn Ldr Hassan Siddiqui? Why was his heroism more significant that Nauman Ali Khan? Why in the first week of March 2019 did the PAF chief urgently visit all PAF bases, particularly those housing the F-16 squadrons? While Wing Commander Nauman Ali Khan was seen being congratulated by the PAF chief, Air Marshal Mujhaid Anwar Khan in a recent PAF video, why has there been no photo or video released of Sqn Ldr Hassan Siddiqui post the aerial engagement?
There is an interesting story of Pak TV channels rushing to Hassan Siddiqui’s parental house in Karachi on 27 February, who spoke to his friends and neighbours. However, after that there is complete radio silence on his status. It is my belief that Squadron Leader Hassan Siddiqui may be the pilot who was shot down by Wing Commander Abhinandan on 27 February. The fact that his heroism is widely recognised by the Pak parliament and ISPR is covering his presence with fake information, strengthens my theory. Even if I am wrong, the fact of the matter is that a nameless PAF F-16 fighter pilot has sacrificed his life for Pakistan.
PAF chief personally congratulating Wg Cdr Nauman Ali Khan for shooting down an IAF MiG-21
While any independent viewpoint on the subject is a worth a discussion the IAF will need to watch out for articles based on false claims and twisted data, such as the recent Foreign Policy media piece by Lara Seligman. Ms Seligman claimed in her post that two US government sources has confirmed to her that ‘no’ F-16s had been lost by the PAF, based on a head count of all Pakistani F-16s by the USG as part of the end user compliances post 27 February.
The FP piece created a furore in Indian media circles because of the damning information it contained. While the IAF countered this by showing crystal clear proof in the form of the electronic signatures and call intercepts in its possession on the subject, Indian agencies were clearly seeing the hand of ISPR in this unwarranted spin to the MiG-21 vs F-16 air combat on 27 February 2019.
For the record : a US Government spokesman later denied any such F-16 count having taken place at all.
According to open sources, the Pakistan Air Force currently has some 85 F-16s in service, including 66 earlier Block A & Bs plus 19 new Block C & Ds. These include 13 F-16s which were earlier in service with the Royal Jordanian Air Force and which are of the same F-16A/ B Block-15 variant already in service with the PAF.
Some initial reports had it that the PAF F-16s involved during the 27 February action included a twin-seat aircraft, which was the one shot down that morning. Hand held mobile videos taken then showed two parachutes descending which would have been the pilots of the F-16 two-seater. While much remains speculative, the well regarded international magazine Air Forces Monthly has the following in its brief analyses ‘Air War over Kashmir’.
Amid the confusion, it remains possible that two fighters in total were downed – one each from the IAF and PAF. According to a spokesman from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, one PAF aircraft was shot down during attacks on installations on the Indian side of Kashmir, the wreckage falling across the LoC in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian MoD claimed that a two-seat PAF F-16B was downed by a Bison using an R-73 air-to-air missile. Both crew members were reported as having ejected. However, Pakistan denies losing any aircraft.