Operation Sindoor: Everything You Need to Know

The Indian Armed Forces launched ‘Operation Sindoor’ in the wake of the barbaric Pahalgam terrorist attack on 22 April 2025, in which twenty five Indians and one Nepali citizen were murdered. India responded on the early morning of 7 May by hitting nine terrorist infrastructures in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir. Witnessing the terror facilities dusted to the ground, Pakistan launched another attack on India, which was continued for four days (till 10 May). Pakistan used a large array of weapons, including swarm drones, unmanned combat systems, loitering munitions, artillery firing, and even missiles against Indian military and civil structures. However, India's integrated air defence and counter-unmanned aircraft system neutralised the threats using both kinetic and non-kinetic ways. In response, India continued the operation involving the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force, resulting in extensive damage to the Pakistani military and other terror facilities, rendering offensive and defensive capabilities of Pakistan ineffective. Inflicted by the heavy damage, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of Pakistan called the Indian counterpart and requested a ceasefire. It was agreed between them that both sides would stop all firing and military action on land and in the air and sea with effect from 1700 hours (05:00 PM) Indian Standard Time (IST) on 10 May 2025. 

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What were the targets?

India's initial targets were nine terrorist camps. These locations were key command centers of the three terrorist organisations: Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Hizbul Mujahideen, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Five of these were inside the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, and four were in Pakistan. Markaz Subhan Allah at Bahawalpur, Sarjal at Tehra Kalan, Markaz Abbas in Kotli, and Syedna Bilal camp in Muzaffarabad (JeM); Markaz Taiba at Murdike, Markaz Ahle Hadith at Barnala, and Shwawai Nalla camp in Muzaffarabad (LeT); and Makaz Raheel Shahid in Kotli and Mehmoona Joya in Sialkot (Hizbul) were targeted and destroyed. The operation lasted for only 25 minutes (01:05 AM to 01:30 AM). After Pakistan's attack on the Indian civil and military facilities, Indian retaliation decimated more terror facilities and launch pads, military bunkers and other infrastructure, and some Pakistani Air Force and army bases. These bases include Arifwala, Bholari, Chunian, Dha, Jacobabad, Looni, Murid, Noor Khan, Parsur, Rafique, Rahim Yar Khan, Sargodha, Sialkot, Skardu and Sukkur. During the press briefing, India provided videos of the strike on enemy targets and satellite photos asserting damage as an aftermath.

Damage inflicted upon Pakistan

The exact nature of the loss for Pakistan is being analysed and has yet to be asserted officially. However, satellite images and photos and videos available on the public platform assert extensive devastation and damage to the targets. It is estimated that more than one hundred terrorists were killed during the air strike conducted on 7 May. Several high value targets, including Yusuf Azhar, Abdul Malik Rauf, and Mudassir Ahmad, were eliminated. At least 50 individuals lost their lives at Bholari Air Base. So, the overall casualties are much higher. Some of the air defence systems of the Chinese origin were jammed, and some of them even got hit. Besides, Pakistan lost a few radar facilities as well. Analysing the photos and videos of the aftermath, it is estimated that Pakistan has lost at least 9 aircraft in the air and on the ground, including transport platforms, electronic warfare, Airborne Early Warning and Control (AWACS) and fighter jets. However, the exact nature of the damage and losses suffered by Pakistan has yet to be officially released by India.

Effect on the PAF bases

One can argue that the damage inflicted upon the PAF bases has a temporary effect only. But that is incorrect. The Indian response was punitive in nature and precise in manner. The aim was to deny the PAF any further operational capabilities, and the objective was achieved by damaging the runways and hangars. In case of a full scale war, the response would be much bigger.

Questions regarding the Indian losses

During the first mission conducted by the IAF, on 7 May, only terrorist infrastructure were targeted, and no Pakistani military assets were harmed. This manner was taken for two main reasons. One, to limit the tension between two nuclear rivals potentially as low as possible; and two, not to lose the surprise element factor. Any such attack on Pakistani military structures to lower the risk of the operation would alert the terrorists of the nearby areas. This would provide them a window of opportunity to escape from the terror centers. This forced the IAF to conduct a high risk mission without conducting the SEAD/DEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences, Destruction of Enemy Air Defences) in a highly sensitive area to inflict the maximum damage.

Was there any military loss to the Indian side? Details have not been officially released yet (as of June 2025) by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). While there’s no clear evidence of the IAF losses, they are minimal nevertheless. For an example, we can look at the futile Israeli “Operation Model 5” in 1973 against Syrian surface-to-air missile sites, where Israel lost at least six fighter jets. It took Israel nine years to develop a robust SEAD strategy to apply in “Operation Mole Cricket 19” in 1982, which was successful. The US lost one F-117, a stealth combat platform, in 1999 during air operations against Serbia, while another F-117 was damaged.

Operation over the enemy territory, covered by a network of modern air defence, is always highly risky. And the IAF did the job successfully in the first such encounter. It has been clearly stated that all pilots are safe and back home. This is the most important thing. One or two pieces of equipment, for debate if lost, can be replaced by a financially strong nation, but a trained pilot is an asset. And they are safe. And they are back home after conducting at least two high risk missions, defying the best weapons Pakistan has! This is not possible without having the best of the best on your side. Such an operation was conducted without any fifth generation fighter jet. No other air force in the world has demonstrated (till now) such a dominating capability against a near peer adversary in the twenty first century. Undoubtedly, some other air forces are also capable, but they are yet to be proven. Yes, Russia-Ukraine could be another example. But, in that conflict, neither side has established air superiority to such a degree that the other side loses offensive capabilities.

In the case of India, the IAF neutralised the counterattack capacity of a nuclear armed state! And this is what makes the IAF the sole such example. Any loss suffered in the combat should be considered against the losses inflicted upon the enemy and the achievements of the objective. Neither should the loss be neglected, nor should it unnecessarily be the prime focus. We should learn and adopt in the next venture.

The significance—ten points

One: The “Operation Sindoor” marked India’s first major introduction to twenty first century warfare on a massive scale. In this brief conflict, Pakistan used, arguably, fourth generation warfare involving non-state actors along with the armed forces, long range standoff munitions, integrated air defence and unmanned platforms. And India triumphed over every challenge with flying colours.

Two: It was a tri-service operation by India. Instead of each of the three branches working individually with their own targets, an integrated force pursued a common goal with coordination between different branches. This allowed India to conduct the operation with much accuracy.

Three: It witnessed an intelligence operation on a massive scale. India identified twenty one terror infrastructures and selected nine of them for the maximum outcome. It also provided an opportunity for India to test twenty first century intelligence measures (ELINT, SIGINT, COMINT, satellite, etc.), which will be crucial to shaping India's future tactics for a much bigger threat situation.

Four: India had an experience of operation in a sensitive area without sanitation of the enemy air defence. It will allow India to mature tactics in a similar future situation.

Five: Following the experience of 7 May, India set up a new strategy for neutralisation of enemy air assets. It allowed India to conduct a strike that slipped through the HQ-9 and HQ-16 air defence systems in service with Pakistan.

Six: The operation provided an opportunity to use, validate, and analyse armament in service with the Indian Armed Forces. Any drawback, if detected, will be addressed accordingly for better performance in future operations.

Seven: This was India's first encounter with unmanned warfare on such a large scale. Pakistan used swarm drones, unmanned combat vehicles and loitering munitions to saturate Indian air defence, exploring an opportunity to strike with more potent munitions. However, India's integrated air defence system and counter-unmanned system stood like an impenetrable wall and rendered most of the attacks ineffective. Thus, India's fully indigenous, automated air defence control and reporting systems, Akashteer (Indian Army), IACCS (IAF), and TRIGUN (Indian Navy), and indigenous counter-unmanned aircraft system (C-UAS) got combat proven and validated. Most significantly, India used non-kinetic measures as well in the neutralisation of the drone attacks.

Eight: Some of India's indigenous systems are now battle-proven—most importantly the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, Akash air defence system, and D4 C-UAS. The combat experience will allow further improvements and will enhance importance in the export market.

Nine: India got its hands on many enemy platforms that were neutralised or fell flat without reaching the target. Most important of it will be the PL-15E, the long range air-to-air missile of Chinese origin, which apparently failed. A good number of it was recovered by India, including in intact or almost intact conditions. Besides, parts of Pakistani rockets and Turkish origin drones were recovered. All of these will allow a thorough analysis.

Ten: This also was India's first introduction to narrative warfare. Pakistan unleashed waves of fake news and tried to set up a false narrative to turn sympathy and confidence towards it. But India nullified the effort by professional media briefings and photo and video evidence. The release of the satellite images further solidified India's claim of success.

Importance of the Indian air defence

The operation saw extensive action of India's air defence system. This involved both indigenous and foreign platforms in service with India. Akashteer, IACCS, and Trigun are integrated into India's larger C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) ecosystem, ensuring seamless coordination, early detection of the incoming enemy projectiles, and accurate interceptions. Besides the S-400, Spyder and Barak, they also witnessed action against different kinds of threats. Interestingly, heavily modernised legacy platforms like Pechora and OSA-AK also played crucial roles. So, India's IADS (integrated air defence system) proved its mettle. India's D4 C-UAS (Drone, Detect, Deter, Destroy) and LLADG (low-level air defence gun) systems, in accordance with the IADS, played a key role in neutralising the wave attacks of the Pakistani drones.

Performance of Pakistan in this conflict

Let's be honest here. Making fun of the failure of Pakistan and the shabby performance of China & Turkiye origin platforms is one thing. But Pakistan is a strong adversary. It is a “near-peer” enemy in many fields. And exactly this is why it needed grit and determination to outwit a powerful and intelligent enemy. Their military (read terrorists in uniform) and terrorist (read mercenaries) facilities were under the protection of a densely arranged integrated air defence system consisting of cutting edge Chinese air defence systems. These systems are presumed to have good detection and tracking. Other than radar for various purposes, Pakistan has good electronic warfare and airborne early warning and control systems as well. Besides, they were being fed satellite intelligence by friendly nations too. In short, Pakistan potentially has the capability to track any movement of the Indian Armed Forces and respond within minutes. During the night of 7 May, upon detection of the IAF jets, the PAF scrambled J-10CE in good numbers and launched PL-15E in large quantities in hopes of scoring a "kill." While the performance of the PL-15E is debatable, it showcases that PAF will try to score kills as much as possible from the possible longest distance to reduce the offensive thrust. This tactic also can be attributed to the use of the AWACS in a much more efficient way for the guidance of the long range missile. Pakistan also likely tried to saturate the Indian air defence system with swarm attacks, rocket artillery, short-range ballistic missiles and air-launched munitions. However, this was made futile by the Indian defence, and the counteroffensive forced Pakistan to request peace.

 Lessons for India

Many experts believe that India made a mistake by distinguishing the military from the terrorists, which reportedly cost India some losses. India has asserted that from now on, no more Pakistani military establishment will be considered different from the terrorists. Besides, India will need standoff platforms in large numbers for a successful and quick SEAD/DEAD operation. It will be wrong to say that the new tactics used by the PAF will make India induct longer range air-to-air missiles in combat, as such projects are already in progress, but likely this will make the progress faster. And it has to be in large numbers. The operation showcases the significance of the IADS and C-UAS. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran-Israel conflict clearly demonstrate the need for a dense, multi-layered network of air defence systems along with C-UAS in large numbers. A successful saturation strike can allow an adversary to exploit the situation and launch a mass strike, resulting in casualties in huge numbers as well as devastation on a large scale. India must address this issue. As financial viability is a concern, India will need to explore an innovative solution.

Similarly, India has to increase its own assets for gathering information and intelligence. Without robust and extensive INTEL equipment and platforms, detection, identification, tracking, and engagement will not be possible. In the era of multi-domain collaborative combat situations, India must be prepared for network-denied environments. Navigation and positioning jamming, electronic warfare, signature concealment, and use of new-generation offensive platforms like directed energy weapons will be increased. India must increase the pace of the fifth generation fighter jet development. A delay will bring nothing but disadvantages only. At the end, India should focus on countering false narratives as well. A victory in combat should not be lost at the narration!

Conclusion

The tri-service synergy, in a coordinated, principled and calibrated manner, conducted an action that was punitive, precise and decisive in nature. Not only were the terrorist camps destroyed, but around a dozen of the Pakistan Air Force bases were decimated, their latest air defence systems humbled, assets charred and military infrastructures dusted to the ground. At the same time, this conflict also highlighted the fields that India must focus on to overcome the faults. In the end, I convey my gratitude to the Indian scientists and the Indian Armed Forces for their sacrifice, valor and contribution.

Article by Sankalan Chattopadhyay (Twitter/X: @vinoddx9)

Representational photos by MoD