Because of This – A History of the Indo– Pak Air War of December 1971 By Air Marshal Vikram Singh
660 pages | Hardback A4 | Rs. 7,995 | 2.5 kg | Manohar Publishers & USI of India
Half a century after the 1971 war redrew the map of South Asia, the Indian and Pakistani air forces remain, in spirit and doctrine, heirs to that decisive conflict. Yet, sadly, impacted by the limited access to official IAF records, no truly comprehensive, critically researched Indian account—covering both the Western and Eastern air campaigns—had emerged until now. In Because of This, Air Marshal Vikram Singh, a decorated, Commander–in–Chief and fighter pilot of the Indian Air Force, delivers what can only be described as the definitive chronicle of the IAF’s role in that war—a tome that fuses encyclopaedic scope with a commander’s analytical insight. The book’s unusual title is drawn from an extraordinary moment in history, which is revealed on page 498. On 16 December 1971, as the Pakistan Eastern Command formally surrendered in Dhaka, Pakistan Army Chief Lt Gen Niazi when quizzed, gestured to the IAF wings on IAF Group Captain Chandan’s uniform and indicated the reason for surrender Air Marshal Dewan: “Because of this… you, the IAF.” Niazi still had 60,000–odd troops and a heavily fortified Dacca with its garrisons still intact, and yet chose to throw in the towel to the Indian armed forces. Niazi’s words acknowledged the relentless air campaign—most notably by No. 28 Squadron’s MiG–21s and No. 37 Squadron’s Hunters—that had pounded Dacca into submission, from the strafing of fortified positions to the audacious rocket attacks on the Governor’s House. That moment—an acknowledgement of air power’s decisive role—is the thematic heartbeat of the book.
A war reconstructed in full dimension
Vikram Singh’s narrative is based on over a decade of meticulous research, drawing on 6000 classified hand written mission reports, official records, post–war assessments and interviews with pilots, forward air controllers and tank commanders. The result is a day–by–day reconstruction of the air war across both theatres—Western Pakistan and the East (now Bangladesh)—and encompasses the context of the land campaigns with which they were closely intertwined and this air–land joint examination narrative has never been attempted earlier. The opening chapters frame the conflict’s political and ethnic origins and India’s dilemma of sheltering 2 million + refugees, tracing the crisis that started the conflict that ultimately resulted in Bangladesh. Some Pak publications have glossed over the removal of Air Commodore Mitty Masud AOC East Pakistan who had opposed the use of PAF Sabres on civilians on moral grounds, this vindicates the high professionalism of the PAF who chose not to compromise their ethics. The reader is then taken through an exacting comparison of the two air forces in 1971:
• IAF strength: 625 combat aircraft PAF strength: approx. 275 combat aircraft, however in the Western Sector the two adversaries were evenly matched with 215 for PAF vs 235 IAF, while on the Eastern sector PAF was vastly outnumbered at 16 vs 148. Aircraft types, their strengths and weaknesses, and the technological asymmetries are explored.
The PAF’s force multipliers–the vaunted AIM–9B Sidewinder on 75% of its F–86 Sabres and the Matra R–530 on its Mirage IIIs—are contrasted with the IAF’s unreliable K–13 (AA–2 Atoll) missile on its MiG–21s. IAF workhorses—Gnats, Hunters, HF–24s, Mysteres, the obsolete Vampires—were limited to 20 mm guns, while the Su–7 fielded a 30 mm cannon with no missile capability. The author also includes the induction of SAM systems and their operational deployment, along with anti–aircraft artillery, the mainstay being the L–60, 40 mm Bofors. Colour Maps covering the main PAF/IAF airfields, radar order of battle, and SAM sites in both the West and East set the stage for the action.
Tactical and strategic narratives
The operational heart of the volume dissects the Western and Eastern sectors. Both sectors are covered in detail with relevant maps and planned strategy, further broken down into a day–to–day linkage of the air–land war across each tactical air centre area (Indian Army Corps– wise and IAF Tactical Air Centre–wise). Pakistan’s essential planning revolved around the dicta of “defence of the East lies in the West” – meaning that the East could not essentially be defended, so capturing of Indian territory in the West would ensure a trade in East Pakistan. Their campaign strategy was largely Army driven with little or no co–operation with PAF and Navy. Book’s Coverage includes the IAF fighter day counter– air missions and dedicated IAF bomber offensives, as well as corresponding PAF day counter–air missions and dedicated night bomber missions. Close air support, combat support, and airlift operations by helicopters and transport aircraft are also covered separately.
A critical analysis at the end of each chapter provides a dispassionate critique and lessons learnt. The significant contribution of the IAF in the decisive ground battles at Shakargarh, siege of Longewala, Defence of Chhamb, Suleimanki, and others are well narrated and analysed. A notable scholarly strength of Because of This is its elaborate cross–referencing on every duel with PAF historian Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail’s balanced, definitive tome, In the Ring and on its Feet: PAF in the 1971 Indo–Pak War (2018) and acknowledges the fairness of that work, which also lists some hitherto unknown PAF losses. Tufail’s book title is a metaphor from boxing— “…by its refusal to duel closer with a stronger enemy, the boxer (PAF) at least remained on its feet, and in the ring, when the bell sounded…” As a riposte, an Indian historian has quipped – “probably that the boxer (PAF) would overwhelmingly have lost the bout on points.”
Key episodes and untold details The author points out a few instances in Tufail’s narrative where the Indian opposing fighter forces in individual air battles are overestimated by the PAF records—a tribute to the dogged intensity displayed by IAF pilots. Singh’s book vividly revisits landmark episodes such as Pakistan’s pre–emptive Operation Chingiz Khan, the IAF’s swift suppression of enemy airbases, precision strike missions and close air support operations culminating in the siege and liberation of Dacca.
The author’s lucid explanations of strike strategy, sortie planning and command decisions provide valuable insight into the IAF’s operational acumen in a high–stakes combat environment. Every single air duel including the landmark air duels like the Boyra pre–war engagement of Flt Lt Roy Andrew Massey & Flt Lt M.A. Ganapathy kills vs. Sabres, the valiant stand of the courageous but outnumbered Flt Lt Sekhon over Srinagar, Flt Lt Dutta vs Flt Lt Chengezi’s F–104 over Naya Chor, Flt Lt Soni’s MiG–21 vs Flt Lt Middlecoat’s F–104 on 12th Dec (the first ever air combat loss of a F–104 to its arch rival , the MiG–21) etc are all embellished with new additional details – many from the hand written classified IAF pilot mission reports. For the avid and discerning historian on both sides, there are many new and updated nuggets unearthed by the author during his extensive research.
• Serial numbers of all 11 F–86 Sabres captured at Tejgaon Air Base.
• Analysis of failed IAF strikes on Tejgaon and the one– pass success against the Hardinge Bridge by a Su–7.
• The correction of a popular myth—Sqn Ldr R. N. Bharadwaj, not Lt Arun Prakash, destroyed Chuck Yeager’s Beech Queen Air at Chaklala.
• The An–12 “Himalayan Geese” low–level carpet– bombing missions over Haji Pir Pass and the fuel and ammo dumps in Changa Manga Forest.
• Details of the last missions of many IAF pilots KIA (killed in action) over Pakistan.
• Details of PAF officer POWs in the East and a list of IAF officer POWs in both sectors.
• The often–overlooked facet of IAF electronic warfare during the conflict is described in detail. The author dispels the Western myth of Soviet TU–126 Moss EW support and details the innovative deployment of IAF MiG–21s as “radio relay posts” that fooled the PAF.
• There is a detailed examination of Indian and Pak AAA efficacy and exaggerated claims.
• New Details of Vampire strikes in J&K and night attacks from Halwara against Pak rail system are documented in tabular form.
• The myth of fratricide against Sqn Leader Devayya by Bhojwani is dispelled (the tale is taken up in a recent Bollywood movie Sky Force).
• The Kilo Flight and birth of the BAF (Bangladesh Air Force) • The Tangail Air drop (the first para drop since WW II) and the race to Dacca embellished with Canberra recce photographs and strategy maps provide an arm–chair view.
• Maritime Support operations including the 3 Hunters attacking and blowing up the Keimara Fuel storage tanks in Karachi port and critically escorting the Osa missile boats back from Karachi harbour to Mangrol.
What sets this tome apart is the author’s ability to balance technical depth with a human lens. Vikram Singh writes with clarity and restraint, weaving in the psychological pressures faced by pilots, land warfare crews and logistical improvisations in the field, and the unpredictable nature of wartime air engagements. Interludes of dry narrative humour add character to what is otherwise a sobering recounting of war. Beyond narrative, the author delves into the broader strategic framework—discussing doctrine evolution, lessons learned, and the lasting implications of the campaign on regional air power dynamics.
Further complementing the text is the photographic record, which is packed with images (rare colour maps in the relevant sections, charts, and previously unseen photographs—including gun camera footage, Canberra Recce photos and images from personal collections). The depth and breadth of aircraft types is fully covered, and to further aid that there are 35 colour profile artworks depicting the camouflage schemes (and a potted history of that serial number during the war), for both Sectors. Highlights include never–before–published pictures such as a bomb–struck PAF Sabre at Tejgaon Air Base in East Pakistan on 4 December (in contrast to the PAF narrative that no Sabres were hit on the ground in Tejgaon.
However, a PAF source states that this was a retired Sabre and not the operational Sabre E). Detailed sortie tables, extensive notes after every chapter, a bibliography, IAF Gallantry and Squadron Battle honour awards and a well– structured index make this an essential reference volume. The epilogue discusses the creation of Bangladesh, post–war challenges, losses suffered and details of officer POWs exchanged including a future (PAF) Chief, Air Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi, who was shot down and captured by the IAF while flying an F–86 Sabre by Flt Lt Massey’s Gnat near Boyra.
Performance, attrition losses, and lessons
The concluding chapter, titled “Air War Critique,” offers a compelling analysis and serves as an indispensable resource for airpower historians, military aviation enthusiasts, and scholars of strategic studies. The analysis is both retrospective and forward–looking, making it equally valuable for military practitioners too. The author asserts: “The 1971 Air War was a Watershed moment for the IAF, it validated all the lesson learnt from the 1965 air war, and was a spectacular clear and unambiguous all arms victory. It was also the first clear victory of Soviet hardware over American equipment after the earlier dismal failures in other wars.
The IAF carried out copybook planning based on classic air warfare principles, across all the arms and the war was a coming– of–age test for it and by all accounts it passed with flying colours.” Planning, strategy, and the tactics of counter–air operations, air defence, DEAD, interdiction, and close air support are analysed by the author in meticulous detail. The sordid failure of the IAF’s AAM (K–13), which achieved only one kill (not 2 kills which seems an error in the Table) —an actual dismal success rate of around 7 % (not 12 % as per the book) —and the PAF’s AIM 9B Sidewinder, which managed six kills at a 13% success rate, probably forced the OEM designers back to the drawing board. The K–13’s failure and the Hunter/Gnat gun jamming in every mission resulted in some kills being forsaken over IAF territory. Around 35 % of the bombs expended by the Canberra fleet were estimated as duds.
In terms of sorties:
• IAF flew 6,693 combat sorties—1.28 sorties per aircraft per day. The support sorties total an additional 5000 odd which is quite significant too.
• PAF flew just 2,955 combat sorties—0.97 sorties per aircraft per day.
• The book includes a detailed and comprehensive IAF/ PAF “Kills” tabular ledger, presenting uniquely, both sides’ viewpoints and contradictions for the Bean Counters. The Author states that the IAF lost 58 aircraft to enemy action,74 in total (10% of its service inventory), and flew 120% more combat sorties—its attrition rate was 0.85%.
• In the 1965 war, on the Ground, the IAF lost 35 aircraft due to paucity of hardened shelters, which was addressed on priority – the results bore fruit in 1971 when only two aircraft were lost on the ground as per the author. Based on performance, the obsolete Vampire immediately and the gas and oxygen guzzling Su–7 later, were phased out from service. The PAF loss was around 50 aircraft, with a higher attrition rate of 1.52% (21% of its serviceable inventory). In contrast, PAF sources estimate around 62 IAF aircraft lost to PAF’s 42. The reviewer concurs with the author that air wars are not won by just Bean counting and comparing attrition losses instead of giving credence to the overall outcome of the air campaign.
The author’s conclusion is blunt: “Clearly, the PAF could not have continued much further with the attrition rate and remaining inventory assets.” And finally offers a measured final assessment, on page 547: “At best the IAF could be characterised as determined, aggressive with a clear aim. The PAF in the West can be characterised as timid and hesitant and, in the East, as intrepid and courageous. (indeed, in the Eastern Sector, the PAF punched above its weight). The PAF’s aim seems to have been to survive the war, while the IAF’s to win it.” It is an apt closure and a fitting conclusion.
Production and presentation
Printed on fine art paper and weighing 2.5 kg, this hardback is richly illustrated with rare photographs, colour maps, sortie tables, aircraft profiles and even gun– camera stills. Singh’s prose is clear, authoritative and often leavened with dry humour, making this as readable as it is scholarly. While the discerning historian might wish for a summary Western Sector order–of–battle/disposition table to complement the Eastern Sector table on page 311, and an aircraft by type table inventory in the opening chapters, —or a postscript on the later careers of key figures involved —such omissions are minor in a work of this magnitude.
Verdict
At its core, Because of This is more than just a war history—it is a masterclass in campaign planning, execution and the decisive application of air power. By documenting both sectors in unprecedented detail, Air Marshal Vikram Singh has filled one of the most glaring historiographical gaps in IAF history. This is balanced book that will sit, weightily and proudly, on the shelf of every serious air power historian, strategist, and aviation enthusiast on both sides of the Border and globally too.
Reviewed by Krishna Jaga (krishnajaga@zohomail.in) Bangalore
A passionate Military Aviation Historian and enthusiast who has been tracking the 1971 Air War since the mid 80’s.