India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, met for the 21st round of Special Representatives' (SR) talks at Dujiangyan near Chengdu in southwestern Sichuan province on 24 November 2018. In discussions that have been described as “constructive and forward looking”, the two SRs resolved to "intensify" their efforts to achieve a "fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable" solution to the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute at an early date.
The truth is that resolution of the dispute is stuck in a groove entirely due to Chinese intransigence. In fact, despite prolonged negotiations, so far it has not been possible to accept a common alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and delineate it on the ground and on military maps. The two sides have failed to even exchange maps showing their perception of the LAC except in the least contentious Central Sector, that is, the Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh borders with Tibet.
Stand-offs on the LAC
Much different from the disputed 4,056 km-long international boundary, the LAC implies de facto military control over respective areas and came into use after the 1962 border war. There are frequent incidents of transgression of the LAC both in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides habitually send patrols up to the point at which the LAC runs in their perception. These patrols leave “tell-tale” signs behind in the form of burjis (piles of stones), biscuit and cigarette packets and other similar markers in a sort of primitive ritual to lay stake to territory and assert their claim.
While no violent incident has taken place in the recent past, there have been many occasions when Indian and Chinese patrols have met face-to-face. Such face-offs have an element of tension built into them and, despite the best of military training, the possibility of a shooting match can never be ruled out. An armed clash that stretches over several days and in which there are heavy casualties can lead to a larger border incident that may not remain localised. The un-delineated LAC is a destabilising factor as major incidents such as the Nathu La clash of 1967 and the Wang Dung stand-off of 1986 can recur.
Unimplemented Agreements
The two sides have signed a number of agreements and agreed on many confidence building measures to maintain peace on tranquility of the border. These include the Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, September 7, 1993; the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas, November 29, 1996; the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, April 11, 2005; the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in India-China Border Areas, April 11, 2005; and, the Agreement on Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, January 17, 2012.
The most recent such agreement is the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), which was signed in October 2013. The BDCA commits the two sides to “periodic meetings” of military and civilian officers and to exchange information – including information about military exercises, aircraft movements, demolition operations and unmarked mines. It emphasises that border patrols must not “tail” each other and recommends that the two sides “may consider” establishing a hot-line between military headquarters in both countries.
Close examination of the BDCA reveals that it falls substantially short of removing the anomalies and impracticalities of similar agreements that have not worked well in the past. Unsurprisingly, major transgressions of the LAC by the PLA have continued unabated. One year after the BDCA was signed, the PLA violated the LAC at Demchok and Chumar in Ladakh. The tense, 73-day long stand-off at the Doklam plateau south of the Chumbi Valley, close to the India-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction, in the summer of 2017 was defused with great difficulty. The political leadership had to intervene at the highest level to get the two armies to disengage at Doklam.
Lofty Rhetoric
According to the Indian statement issued after the 21st round of border talks, the two sides "underlined the importance of approaching the boundary question from the strategic perspective of India-China relations and agreed that an early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries." The Chinese statement released by the Chinese approvingly quoted the Indian NSA as having said that "a mutually acceptable solution to the boundary issue will send a positive signal to the outside world that the two ancient civilisations of India and China have the wisdom and capability to peacefully resolve problems through dialogue and consultation".
Similar statements have been made after various summit meetings between the Chinese president and the Indian prime minister. At the Wuhan summit in April 2018, the first after the Doklam stand-off, the two leaders “underscored the importance of maintaining peace and tranquillity in all areas of the India-China border region…” To this end, they… “directed their militaries to earnestly implement various confidence building measures agreed upon between the two sides”. Notably, the lofty rhetoric has not translated into significant forward movement towards dispute resolution.
It is in India’s interest to seek early resolution of the territorial dispute with China as India will be left with only one military adversary to contend with. Clearly, that does not suit the Chinese game plan as it will distort the current military equation between India and Pakistan. The Chinese wish to leave the dispute “for future generations to resolve”, as Deng Xiao Ping had famously told Rajiv Gandhi in 1988. China’s obvious negotiating strategy is to resolve the territorial dispute with India only when the Chinese are in a much stronger position in terms of comprehensive national strength so that they can dictate terms. Hence, though the probability of another India-China border war is low, it cannot be ruled out.
Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)
The writer is former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi