Explaining irrationality is difficult. The Indian Air Force has yearned for a 42 fighter squadron force. However, after the two Rafale squadrons are operational, probably by 2022, and the long overdue phase-out of the MiG-212 completed, the IAF will have just 29 squadrons: 13 Su-30, 6 Jaguar, 3 Mirage 2000, 3 MiG-29, 2 Tejas, and 2 Rafale. The Air Force is modernising some of its existing aircraft, which is wise, but only if Government of India understands that we are well below expected strength and modernisation serves only as a stop-gap while waiting for new aircraft.
First, let’s look at the magical pixie dust figure of 42 squadrons. That was formulated decades ago, when the Chinese Air Force was limited in its capabilities on our northern frontiers. That figure is meaningless now, as China continues relentless modernisation of its air force and its Tibet basing capability. Moreover, for many years the Chinese have shaped their military forces to operate on an all-China basis, instead of the regional model they have earlier been built on. Today the Chinese Air Force has 1700 combat aircraft of which perhaps 500 are 4th Gen. Meanwhile, Pakistan has grown to 20 squadrons including its elite Combat Commander’s School . China is modernising at the approximately rate of 100 new aircraft every year and Pakistan at some 20 every year. And we are actually phasing out at least 40 aircraft every year.
No one is saying that the Chinese Air Force is 3-metres tall. It surely has some problems with its newer designs, and its 5th Gen aircraft have a very long way to go despite Chinese tom-toming otherwise. Nonetheless, China has a GDP of $14-trillion, a massive aviation R&D base, a propensity for hard work – and the determination to overtake the US in military power. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that India should actually be aiming for 50 combat squadrons, not 42. Thus the IAF is actually woefully short.
We Indians inhabit two realities simultaneously. One of the “ideal” the other as “real”. In an ideal world, the IAF should have nine Rafale squadrons plus nine of the Tejas, and as first of the six MMRCA squadron start standing up, say by 2023, this would-permit 50 combat squadrons, even after six of the older existing squadrons are phased out.
But in the real world, instead of formalising a 6+3 squadron Rafale deal in 2012, this was reduced to two squadrons in 2015, and that from without provision for maintenance reserve/strike-off wastage (MR/SOW) of 6 aircraft, plus 8 more for the TACDE. The LCA Tejas production remains stuck in some black hole; the LCA Mk.II, which is the IAF’s dream version, will not fly till 2023 – at the earliest. Meanwhile, the Government has sent out an RFI for 114 new fighters even though more Rafales make most sense from the viewpoint of continuity and standardisation.
What has really been happening? In 1962, India spent 1.9% of GDP on defence (excluding pensions). After the 1962 China-border war, this stayed around 3-3.5% until 1989, when the financial crisis forced a temporary decline. When the economy recovered, the GOI decided to keep money to spend on “vote-buying schemes” and aside from an occasional bump up, this came down to 1.65% in 2018. Because salaries keep going up, such reduction has really been on new+ equipment, so the result is that India’s armed force have a 30-year modernisation pileup.
The size and structure of India’s armed forces, however, requires a minimum of 3.5% spending, which means another $50-billion year on year for equipment from now onwards. Will the GOI spend this, even as we in 2019 become the world’s fifth largest economy after the US, China, Japan, and Germany ? But, without funds, there can no modernisation. Indeed, the way it is going, India could well have to downsize its forces by half, say to 20 Divisions, 18 fighter squadrons, and 50 first class warships.
We could live with this, but this requires a major and fundamental policy change and could well mean compromising on Kashmir, giving up the Aksai Chin and Arunachal to the Chinese. Accepting the Chinese offer of withdrawing its Arunachal claims for India with a counter offer of acknowledging that Aksai Chin is part of China will work only for a short time because Beijing is taking an increasingly expansive view of its “lost” territories.
If this is what the Government (and people of India) want, so be it. But we cannot to give up our independent status. Now, if the $50-billion missing from the defence budget were being spent productively, that would be one thing. Instead it is going in subsides which encourage inefficiency. This is a lose-lose situation: neither guns nor butter with the money saved by cutting the defence budget in half.
By Ravi Rikhye