And suggestions on Shaping the Indian Response

…. China’s splendid isolation nurtured a particular Chinese self-perception, Chinese elites grew accustomed to the notion that China was unique---not just a “great civilization” among others, but civilization itself.
Henry Kissinger
Some 200 years back, Napoleon had prophetically expressed that “let China sleep, for when she wakes, she will shake the world.” Unquestionably, China has gone far beyond this axiom, and the world acknowledges that. Over the past two decades or so, China has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies with foreign reserves now estimated at over $ 3.4 trillion and fielding what is regarded as the second most powerful armed forces in the world. China is fast catching up with the now economically weary and the strategically fatigued United States of America. China’s spectacular rise naturally translates into its ever growing global clout, propelling it to have unbridled geo-political and military ambitions – not only in Asia but world-wide.
China’s burgeoning financial, and consequently military might, continues on a rapid upswing, synergised by its ancient civilisational wisdom of real politik embellished by strategic vision and nationalistic ambitions which are unparalleled. That China will be a ‘super power’ by 2030, if not earlier, is understating the stark reality. If the 21st Century has to be an Asian one, as repeatedly proclaimed by many geo-political luminaries, China leads the way well ahead of other players on the scene including India, Japan, S. Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia and few others. China is usually bracketed with India (and Japan) as also lead players in Emerging Asia. However, commentators opine that India is merely plodding along, not really rising to its true potential owing to so many inner contradictions. As noted US analyst George Tanham once pithily noted, “India lacks strategic culture”. Still, China regards India as its main rival, globally, regionally, economically and militarily, which makes the growing asymmetric chasm between the two neighbours (and Asian giants), a cause of serious worry for India. Although India is an ascendant power, how will it would cope with the rise of China is, perhaps, going to be the most acute military challenge for us in the foreseeable future.
An analysis of China’s stated aims
Even as China builds up a formidable military machine, it is conscious of inculcating a responsible image to the world in keeping with its growing global status. Since 1998, China has been issuing ‘White Papers’ every two years on its National Defence, these papers comprehensively covering all macro-issues concerning this as also China’s stated aims.
The aforesaid ‘White Papers’ encapsulate China’s pursuit of a defence policy which ensures a stable security environment and permits the development of its economy and the modernisation of its military. Importantly, it stresses military power as a guarantor of China’s strategic autonomy to ensure that China continues to enjoy unrestricted access to critical strategic resources including oil and natural gas. China further stresses that its national defence policy is primarily defensive in nature and that it would launch counter-attacks only in self-defence, further claiming that it “plays an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and stability.” China continues to proclaim that it follows a “no first use” nuclear doctrine and is “a responsible nuclear and space power”.

However, most strategic analysts in the world over, particularly its neighbours, dismiss China’s noble-sounding rhetoric as little more than a public-relations exercise as China’s actions in the past few years, across Asia, have been anything but contributing to regional harmony. On the contrary, China is well on the way to become a regional hegemon as many of its actions clearly show, particularly the turbulence created by muscle-flexing in the many waterways which lap the Chinese coastline, whether it is the South China Sea or the East China Sea including its many claims on various island territories in the region. China even scoffs at the US and other maritime powers including France, Japan and Australia in the Indian and Pacific Oceans region which is a well acknowledged matter.
One of the manifestations of the changing Chinese doctrine was introduction of a new cliché in the lexicon of Chinese think tanks, that being the Grand Periphery Military Strategy, which presupposes the fact that the People’s Liberation Army, surprisingly to many, actually lacked the capability of defending its ‘far flung borders.’ Now Chinese military thinkers are reinforcing a newer strategy to be adopted in the face of the rapidly changing geopolitical dynamics in South, Central, South East and North East Asia. However, such thinking appears to have petered out a few years back, with the Chinese now concentrating on their globally ambitious Borders and Road Initiative, the Chinese in recent years having reorganised their entire overall defence management structures.
China’s One Belt and One Road (OBOR) Initiative
Since advent of President Xi Jinping on the nation’s political firmament, China is truly “thinking and acting globally”. The OBOR initiative was first announced by President Xi in 2013, which grandiose concept is rooted in history and generally conforming to the ancient Silk Routes which once linked the great Chinese Empires to the heart of Europe. However, in its proposed avatar, the OBOR will follow both the land route, referred to as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the sea route labeled as the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

The Silk Road Economic Belt essentially comprises a network of roads linking Xi’an in China to Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Russia and Europe. Apart from these countries which were once linked along the ancient Silk Road, more nations of Southern and SE Asia have now been included. There are six major project corridors envisaged, the two most important ones in India’s vicinity being the $ 62 billion budgeted China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which links Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang with the deep-sea port of Gwadar in Pakistan, traversing the disputed territory of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Once it becomes fully functional, China would have to some extent successfully overcome, ‘The Malacca Strait Syndrome’. The other in India’s neighbourhood is the proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor.
Indian officials have not attended the two meetings on the CPEC hosted by China as the CPEC passes through Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) which is Indian territory under occupation by Pakistan since 1948. “Economic benefits should not transcend a nation’s sovereignty” and India has maintained this stance, also not forgetting that the Shakgsam Valley (5180 sq kms) which was part of the erstwhile princely state of J&K, and ceded to China by Pakistan in November 1963.
Some years back, Michael Caine and Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in their seminal work ‘Interpreting China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future’, have opined that “the continued increase in China’s relative economic and military capabilities, combined with its growing maritime strategic orientation, if sustained over many years, will almost certainly produce both a re-definition of China’s strategic interests…… that directly or indirectly challenges many of the existing equities.”
China’s Defence Spending

Freeing China from the restrictive Maoist economic thinking in the mid-70s, China’s then-leader Deng Xiaoping had unleashed market reforms which The Economist aptly summarised as “….. the most dynamic burst of wealth creation in human history.” This growing economic clout is translating into military muscle and modernisation of the armed forces at a pace which no country in the world can match. As widely surmised, China’s declared defence budgets are normally shown as much lower than their actual value. From US$ 146 billion in 2016, the Chinese defence budget went up to $ 165 billion in 2018 and this year’s budget was up by 8.1 percent to a staggering $ 177.6 billion.
China’s defence budget exceeds that of all major Asia-Pacific countries put together, with Japan a distant second with around US$ 70 billion. India with a falling rupee depreciation, substantial fiscal deficit and large governmental debts, is far behind in defence allocations with this year’s defence budget being a paltry US$ 45 billion. The overall strategic implications for the entire Asia-Pacific region of China’s triple-digit defence spending can easily be comprehended.
China’s Core Interests and Internal Imbalances
It is not surprising to China watchers that its all-pervading assertiveness has led to the definition and usage by both its official and unofficial institutions of its “core interests”, which are spreading to embrace newer sensitivities. Earlier, such interests were confined to a few areas where the Chinese Communist Party would brook no dissenting views, which importantly included its national security, national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Tibet became China’s major “core interest” after its annexation in 1951 and so did the island of Taiwan, which was ceded to Japan in 1895, but is today an economically vibrant self-governing democracy, calling itself the Republic of China. Its giant neighbour, The People’s Republic of China has repeatedly warned the world that it would invade Taiwan if it ever declared independence. More recently, the restive province of Xingjian (formerly East Turkestan), the massive region in the west of China, which has seen frequent clashes between the local Uighur Muslims and the Han Chinese being settled there from mainland China, is now also an important part in the list of China’s “core interests”.
China has also vociferously warned of its “core interests” in the South China Sea as being “non-negotiable”, warning nations such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei which lie astride this waterway. China has cautioned the US to keep its naval vessels away from this waterway and some years back had also aggressively cautioned an Indian naval vessel, INS Airawat, which was sailing in the territorial waters of Vietnam where India has been prospecting for oil. China has now included the sustaining of its existing political system as a “core interest”.

However, internal stability currently remains the most critical constituent of China’s national security. The significant internal imbalances which worry China are Taiwan, Tibet, the restive Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region but also uneven regional development compared to the east, namely its coastal belt which is far ahead in development indices than the seemingly impoverished western region. In addition, Chinese concerns also embrace its demographic clock where the population is ageing at a rapid rate. It is estimated that by the mid-21st century, more than half of China’s population will be over sixty years old. Barry Naughton in his book on the Chinese economy has surmised that “China will grow old before it has had the opportunity to grow richer.” In addition, China’s growing energy demands to fuel its growth, is causing environmental problems both internally and internationally while unchecked modernisation is also causing severe environmental degradation within China, with acid rain getting worse and its total agricultural land having decreased by some 20 percent.
China’s Defence Modernisation
China has shifted gears since the collapse of its major threat, namely the Soviet Union, in the early nineties of the 20th century. Their paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping had ordained that “small and medium local conflicts and not general wars were the most likely threats.” Gradually the Chinese have, especially after the Gulf War, honed their doctrine to consider “Local Wars under Conditions of Informationisation.” China’s military modernisation strategy is based on the PLA’s simultaneous transformation through mechanisation and informationisation. The Chinese have been rapidly building up their Information Warfare capabilities, with reportedly 30,000 computer professionals and two ‘Hacker Brigades’ as part of the Chinese forces.

Strategic Forces: China maintains a strong nuclear
deterrence, employing land based ICBMs, with currently around 250 nuclear
warheads in its inventory, and the arsenal grows. There are around 60 ICBMs (DF-31
of 8000kms and DF-31A of 13000 kms range). By around 2020, experts opine that it
will have 100 ICBMs and 6 Jin-class
nuclear submarines, each armed with 12 sea-launched ballistic missiles. Besides,
there are the DF-16 (improved SRBM), the
DF-17 (hypersonic glide vehicles), the DF-26 medium range ballistic missiles.
China’s Second Artillery Corps has over 1000 short range ballistic missiles
with conventional warheads.

Land Forces: The PLA remains the world’s largest army with 1.6 million men in its regular forces. As per the Military Balance, there are now 81 Combined Arms Brigades (CABs) and 4 Divisions (to India’s 28) with 7660 main battle tanks (to India’s 3900) and nearly 18,000 artillery pieces (to India’s 10,000). Besides there are nearly 60 Divisions of the People’s Armed Police as an internal security force, the bulk of which are demobilised PLA Divisions. The PLA is gradually fielding an ultra-modern tank, the VT-4 MBT, in its armoured formations

The PLA Navy: To support its ever-expanding naval ambitions, not only in the seas surrounding it, but for naval operations against Taiwan and in the entire Asia-Pacific to thwart even the US flotilla and the navies of the other countries in its vicinity, the Chinese Navy is actually the focus of modernisation. By 2025-2030, it could deploy three aircraft carrier battle groups, 60 submarines, including 10 nuclear, and nearly 80 surface combatants. The Indian Navy may just have two aircraft carriers and 16-18 submarines with 2 nuclear submarines and 58 surface combatants by then.
PLAAF: The Chinese Air Force is currently undergoing a feverish qualitative upgrade, its “vintage fleet” being rapidly replaced by fourth and fifth generation fighters such as the Russian Su-27, Su-30, Su-35 and its Chinese copy, the J-11. The indigenous mainstay is the J-10 and also has jointly developed the JF-17 Thunder multi-role aircraft with Pakistan which country is receiving 250 of these (see Vayu Issue IV/2019).

The J-20 fifth generation stealth fighter
The Chengdu J-20 fifth generation stealth fighter
has recently joined service with the PLAAF, and will shortly be joined by the Shenyang
J-31 which according to analysts, is comparable with the US F-35, while the Xi’an
H-20 stealth strategic bomber is under development. Like India, China has been air-to-air
refueling and AWACS capability. By 2020-22, it will have over 2300 fourth/fifth
generation combat aircraft compared with the IAF’s 750 (in the best possible
modernisation scenario) and this asymmetry is a matter of major concern for
India. Significantly, China is planning to build some 60 airfields in the Tibetan
region alone. ABMs: China tested its first anti-satellite missile in early 2007 and in 2010 conducted an actual anti-ballistic missile test. It has launched three manned missions and a lunar orbiter and is planning launch of nano satellites that will serve as virtual ‘space mines’. By 2020, China plans to have 200 remote sensing satellites plus also a manned military space station: very first in the world
Rapid Reaction Forces: China is developing rapid reaction capability for speedy and potent responses to varying battlefield contingencies. These high-technology based rapid reaction forces will be deployed for small scale intense local military operations or in support of pre-emptive operations. The Chinese already maintain a fully operational Airborne Corps and according to unconfirmed reports, another Airborne Corps HQ, is under raising. These forces could be tasked also in support of China’s “core interests” as specified earlier, whenever required.
China’s River Water Machinations

Tibet is the water reservoir of India but China virtually exercises control over the waters of rivers like the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), Indus and Sutlej flowing into India, thanks to is superior upper riparian position on the Tibet plateau. There are alarming reports that China plans to unilaterally divert waters of the Brahmaputra to its vast arid areas in the north and west. It also has commenced work to dam some other rivers flowing into India. India’s hydel project on the Brahmaputra, upstream of Pasighat, has been on hold for a very long time and the callous attitude of China in water management upstream of the Indian rivers has already resulted in two devastating flash floods. In June 2000 parts of Arunachal Pradesh were suddenly flooded after bursting of the Yiong River Dam and release of excess water. In 2005, the river Sutlej was flooded in Himachal Pradesh because of the Pare Chu Lake in Tibet, which caused havoc to many low lying villages in some regions of Himachal Pradesh near the Indo-China border. In addition, the already completed construction of the 116 metres high Zangmu Dam on the Tsangpo in eastern Tibet in a high seismic zone, can well cause havoc in Assam if there was to be a major earthquake in the region.
Although former Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh had himself assuaged the concerns of Indian parliamentarians at the Rajya Sabha in August 2011 regarding China’s diversion of waters from the Brahmaputra or damming it inside China, India will be well advised to ensure continuous satellite intelligence coverage of China’s activities in this area. China is known to keep its river water strategies under strict wraps and does not allow any outsiders for on-site visits, disregarding UN recommendations on water data sharing.
The China–Pakistan Collusion
With Pakistan becoming a near-vassal state of China and considering the strategic congruence between the two nations, a credible collusion between them during a major conflict with India is the future cannot be ruled out. China has viewed India as its primary geo-strategic and economic rival and as it desires to attain total pre-eminence in the region, has a clear strategy to keep India pre-occupied regionally. Overall, for China, Pakistan is a low-cost proxy for the former’s machinations in South Asia whilst for Pakistan, China remains a low-cost, albeit high value, guarantor of its security vis-à-vis India.
Importantly, to “influence” the agitating Muslim Uighurs in its Xinjiang province, China needs Pakistan’s assistance in ensuring that its own terror groups and even those of the Afghan Taliban, do not reinforce the Uighurs in their fight agitation against the Chinese and must be suitably leveraged.

Such strategic China-Pakistan cooperation which began is the 1960s has, particularly over the past 30th years expanded into multiple domains including the political, diplomatic, military, economic, technical and cultural fields. Very recently, after India abrogated Articles 370 and 35A from its state of J&K, it was China that requested a special closed-door meeting of the UNSC members on the issue.

Thus, critically, apart from myriad aspects of military cooperation with Pakistan, China has accorded substantial assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear programme, as also development of satellites and assistance in cyber technologies. Pakistan’s missile programmes including the Ghaznavi, Shaheen and Nasr series of ballistic missiles owe their development to China. Importantly, China has massively assisted Pakistan in the transfer of technology and joint production of fighter aircraft, particularly the JF-17 Thunder a range of UAVs and other systems.
Ominous Future
Notwithstanding several rounds of dialogue between India and China over the last many years on many vexed issues between the two countries – including the contentious border matter – Chinese actions towards India are hardly encouraging. China appears to be still living in the ‘Middle Kingdom’ syndrome and resents Indian aspirations as a second Asian power. Its ‘string of pearls’ stratagem dearly aims at the strategic encirclement of India, confining it to the backwaters of the Indian Ocean and restricting India to merely southern Asia.
China’s nuclear weapons-cum-missiles relationship with Pakistan and modernisation of the Pakistani Armed Forces, is clearly aimed against India. Since the last few years, the Chinese footprint in the disputed POK region has grown under the garb of road construction engineers being stationed in the region (approximately 7000 to 10,000 personnel already), Media reports suggest that portions of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir have been leased to China for 50 years or more, converting POK as Pakistani territory and in doing so, legitimising the 5180 sq kms ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963. This is now referred to as ‘Chinese sovereign territory’ and India thus faces yet another front.
China has also made inroads into India’s immediate neighbourhood through Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, providing them weaponry and military training facilities besides constructing strategic infrastructure.
Prognosis and the Indian Response
Thus, the not-so-peaceful rise of China and its provocative actions as concerns India and already stated in this article, portends more competition than cooperation between the two Asian giants. China’s stated reunification policies make it clear that it would use military power to regain certain parts in its neighbourhood which it perceives to be its own. Thus, even as India it endeavours to resolve all contentious problems with China in a mature and peaceful manner, it must get gear up to face the Chinese dragon head-on for China only respects strength.
In order to do this, India needs to firstly correctly assess likely Chinese threats, both in the short-term and long term. The Indian government must not play down Chinese challenges in any form. Secondly, we must address with determination the present military asymmetry to counter threats from China and ensure no bureaucratic sluggishness or procedural shortcomings come in the way of the identification and procurement of military hardware for all the three services, within a speedy time-frame. The three Services must became capable of offensive operations and not just remain on the defensive.
Thirdly, India must pay adequate attention in further developing its strategic infrastructure along the Indo-China border. Nuclear and space assets require to be vastly improved as well as electronic and cyber warfare wherewithal. Fourthly, under an international umbrella, we need to formalise either bilateral or regional river water-management treaties between India and China and other Asian lower riparian states.
Finally, India needs to take the lead to energise all Asian groupings such as ASEAN to ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region – with active cooperation of the USA, Japan and Australia. The QUAD formulation, needed for ensuring a rules-based maritime order for the entire Indo-Pacific sea-lanes, must be taken to its logical conclusion.
It is about time that India carries out a reality check of its overall capabilities vis-à-vis China. It now needs to upgrade its military strategy from dissuasion to deterrence. For effective deterrence, India needs to enhance the capabilities of its nuclear forces by fielding long range Agni IV and V Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles and sea-launched long-range missiles by nuclear submarines to complete the nuclear TRIAD.

Synergy of the three Services and India’s future military build-up to deter the formidable Chinese will only be effective if the country goes in for long awaited defence reforms in India’s higher defence management structure. The 2019 Independence Day announcement by PM Narendra Modi on instituting appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the Indian Armed Forces is a welcome step but we now also need to establish Theatre Commands to optimally synergise functioning of the three Services. In this context, the Andaman & Nicobar Command must be given far more strategic muscle to adequately thwart Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean region.

TIME Magazine cover on the China vs India matter
It must be reiterated that India will only be able to occupy its rightful place on the global high table, if it accords adequate attention to enhancing its combat preparedness. Even as India rightly endeavours to nurture peaceful relations with China, it must never forget the simple truism that China really respects strength even as it feverishly prepares for regional and global dominance. Diplomatic niceties have little place in China’s statecraft.