Lt Gen BS Pawar on why “Attack Helicopters must be organic with the Army”!
Boeing AH-64E Apache of the IAF (Image from Boeing)
All major armies of the world, including those of our adversaries, have full-fledged air wings of their own, comprising various types of helicopters, including attack as also fixed wing aircraft in their inventory. Both China and Pakistan have very potent attack helicopters in the aviation inventory of their respective armies. Pakistan Army Aviation already have Russian Mi-25/Mi-35 and US Huey Cobra attack helicopters and have recently acquired new Chinese Z-10 attack helicopters, recently inducted by the PLA. According to reports, the Pak Army is also in process of acquiring 30 new generation attack helicopters from Turkey, the A-129 ATAK, reportedly being a copy of the Italian ‘Mangusta’ attack helicopter but with far better high altitude capability. It is therefore surprising that the Indian military mind is still stuck in the quagmire of unresolved command and control aspects, that of an aerial weapon platform which is essentially designed for manoeuvre and attack against ground targets and which forms an essential component of land forces the world over. While over the past years, there has been some forward, but slow, movement on this matter, the continuing ambiguity and confusion at the Government and military levels fuels unwarranted suspicions, controversies and rivalries between the Army and Air Force with no light at end of the tunnel.
The logic
The case for inclusion of attack helicopters as part of the army goes back to 1963 when Gen JN Chaudhary, then COAS, stressed the requirement for a separate Army air wing. He emphasised that efforts at increasing firepower and mobility of the Army would be incomplete without an integral aviation element comprising light, medium, heavy as well as armed/ attack helicopters. This quest was partially fulfilled with formal establishment of the Army Aviation Corps on 1 November 1986, but this was nowhere near what had been envisioned in 1963, especially in respect to attack helicopters.
Indian Army Commandos during exercise (image via author)
The Turkish A-129 ATAK (image from internet)
The Chinese Zhishengji-10 attack helicopter (from the internet)
The Indian Army thereafter continued unabated efforts over the next three and a half decades to overcome bureaucratic barriers, inter-service rivalry and lack of political direction on the issue of ownership of attack helicopters. The Army’s relentless pursuit of this need resulted in October 2012 when the then UPA Government, accepting logic of the Army’s case and directed that, henceforth, all attack helicopters would be owned, operated and maintained by the Army. Whilst the Government directive ruffled a lot of feathers, particularly those of the Air Force, the need for potent tactical airpower at immediate call of the ground force commander was finally recognised. Based on this decision, it was logically assumed by the Army that the formidable Boeing Apache AH-64E helicopters very recently procured from the US by India would now be part of the Army Aviation Corps inventory. It, therefore, came as a complete surprise to the Army when the UPA Government reneged on its earlier order and directed that the initial 22 Apaches being acquired would be with the Indian Air Force “because of the acquisition processes already in motion”! Such reasoning was totally devoid of logic and it was quite clear that Government-of the- day had succumbed to Air Force and bureaucratic pressures. In this regard, the statement of the then Air Force CAS NAK Browne that the Air Force could not allow “little air forces doing their own thing” is quoted, but he ignored the fact that both the Coast Guard and the BSF have air wings of their own. More than ever it still rankles the Air Force that India’s Navy now boasts an inventory of over 300 sophisticated aircraft, of all types, including 4th generation fighters! It is beyond has a major problem with regards to the world’s second largest Army having an air wing including attack helicopters under its command. It is high time the Air Force got off its fixated mindset of protecting its (air) turf at all costs and accepted the realities of present day high intensity, mobile warfare. The Army’s recommendation to the Government of that time to ‘share’ the 22 Apache helicopter assets on a 50:50 basis was also vehemently objected to. However, possibly to assuage feelings of the Army and keeping in mind operational requirements, the Government had given an in principle approval for 39 Apaches for the three Strike Corps. However, in May 2017 the NDA Government lowered this figure to 11 Apaches under the repeat option clause of 22 Apaches being procured by Air Force, and subsequently reduced this further to six Apaches in August 2018, possibly owing to financial constraints. While a unit of six Apaches makes little military sense, and is certainly not a rational combat organisation from the tactical employment point of view, some initial start has been made and the Army will no doubt subsequently pursue its case for greater numbers, based on its operational requirements. As per reports, all 22 Apaches for the Air Force have already been inducted and the induction of six Apaches for the Army is likely to commence next year.
HAL Chetak helicopter of the Indian Army (photo: MoD)
HAL Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) of the Indian Army (photo: Angad Singh)
Boeing AH-64E Apache (image: Boeing)
But why attack helicopters for the Army?
The attack helicopter is one of the most versatile weapon systems currently available to the field force commander in militaries the world over. The primary mission of attack helicopters is to intrinsically participate in land battles, to support ground operations in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA) as a combined arms team, which immensely expands the ground commander’s options in battlefield time and space. Battlefield leverage with attack helicopters is achieved through a combination of reconnaissance, mobility and firepower which is unprecedented in the evolution of land warfare. The greatest contribution to success in the battlefield is the accretion that this gives the commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times virtually anywhere, in the form of direct fire, facilitating ‘Effects Based Operations’.
It is imperative that attack and armed helicopters must be at the beck and call of the field force commander and also piloted by men in ‘Olive Green’ who are integral in fully understanding the ground situation and so ensuring optimum utilisation of this battle winning resource. This is the critical rationale on which the Army’s case for ownership of these assets is based which has long been accepted in virtually all other modern armies of the world. Unlike the Indian Air Force, Army Aviation units and helicopters need to be located very close to their operational areas, virtually alongside the formations they are affiliated to, especially at the Corps level. During war, these units will operate from ‘Forward Composite Aviation Bases’, having all requisite security, maintenance, fuelling and arming facilities. This employment philosophy dictates the need to develop organisations that enhance aviation capabilities to support the concept of operations of field commanders and tailored to meet the evolving operational requirements - hence the concept of an Aviation Brigade with each Strike Corps – and not being static at bases which are relatively distant away, as is the case with the Air Force. Following the Indian Army’s Doctrine of ‘Cold Start’ or ‘Proactive Strategy’ as the Government would like to call it, has meant major restructuring, with the Holding/Pivot Corps as ‘first responder’ to enable quick and immediate action within 48-72 hours, using integral assets at the Corps level. For this, all resources required (including attack helicopters) must be under command and control of the field force commander. The present arrangement that ownership of these vital assets is with the Air Force and operational control with the Army is not operationally sound: in no major Army of the world does such an absurd arrangement exist!
The HAL Rudra attack helicopter (photo: Angad Singh)
(image: Angad Singh)
Army’s Attack Helicopter Inventory: Present & Future
Despite the above hurdles, the Indian Army has already inducted in some quantity, armed version of the HAL advanced light helicopter (ALH), called the Rudra. While 50 Rudras are already in service and operationally deployed, including some in the current standoff area of Ladakh, another 20-30 are planned for induction in the next two years, thereby taking the total to some 70-80 of these armed helicopters, by no means a small number. The Air Force too has one helicopter unit equipped with ten Rudras. Although not a typical attack helicopter, the Rudra has an array of potent weapon systems including cannon, rockets, air-to-air and air-to-ground antitank missiles (ATGM). Rudra squadrons form part of the Holding/Pivot Corps, constituting a formidable offensive punch to the field force commander.
The Light Combat Helicopter (LCH), also developed by HAL is a milestone achievement, hitherto exclusive club of such light attack helicopters, like Eurocopter’s Tiger, Bell’s AH 1Z Super Cobra, Turkey’s A-129 ATAK and China’s Z-10. The LCH is derived from the ALH and designed for anti–personnel and anti– armour roles, with capability of operating at high altitudes (16,000 feet ASL), a distinct advantage over other attack helicopters. The LCH will be a major asset of the field force commander and operate both in the plains and mountains. During the Kargil conflict of 1999, the only attack helicopters with the IAF (Mi-25/Mi-35) could not operate at high altitudes, where the conflict was concentrated. As per reports, initial clearance for five LCH for the Army and ten for the Air Force has already been given by the Government while the overall requirement for the Army is much larger and induction is likely to commence in the year 2020-21.
Some myths – that need busting!
However, there remain efforts by “vested interests” to spread disinformation on capabilities of the Army to hold, operate and maintain aviation assets, orchestrated mainly through the print media both in leading newspapers and some defence journals. This has particularly been so after the Government’s decision was announced on ownership issues of attack helicopters in the Army’s favour.
HAL Cheetah of the Indian Army at Siachen (image MoD)
Army Aviation Dhruv ALH with artillery gun under slung (image via author)
Some of these are not only laughable but need dismissal with utter disdain! An article in The Times of India, a few years back, highlighted the fact that the Army does not have an “aviation culture” and hence was incapable of operating and maintaining modern day attack/heavy helicopters, while another article talked the Army’s inability to absorb and maximise utility of these expensive military assets. There are very many other untruths spread around about Army Aviation pilots and engineers, on aspects related to flight safety, training, maintenance practices and so on. Most of the time these are ignored or brushed aside by the Indian Army, but the time has now come to end this hogwash! The Indian Army’s Aviation Corps came into being on 1 November 1986 and is well into its fourth decade. The Corps has earned many laurels both in conflict (during Op Pawan and Op Vijay) and is continuing to play a stellar role in counter insurgency operations. It has been in the forefront for search and rescue operations during numerous natural calamities and disasters faced by the country. Most importantly, Army Aviation helicopters are the lifeline of troops deployed in the extreme climatic environment and treacherous terrain of the Siachen Glacier, where pilots operate these machines to the extreme limits of their flight envelope. The Army was the first to induct the HAL twin-engined Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter and was appointed lead service for development of the armed version of the ALH the Rudra. The Army was once again in the lead for evolution and induction these gunships. The ALH has now matured into becoming one of the most modern utility helicopters in the world and is proving its superior high altitude capabilities during the present standoff in Ladakh. Also for the uninformed, the basic training regime for both helicopter pilots and technicians is common for all the three Services and is conducted at their respective training institutes and establishments: however specialist and advance training is specific to each service’s requirement. Therefore, let there be no doubt in anyone’s mind that Army Aviation pilots and engineers are as good (if not better) than their counter parts in the Air Force and if the men in blue can fly and maintain the new Apaches and Chinooks, so can the men in olive green. Another bogey raised from time and again is rationalisation of resources and cost benefits that accrue with a single service handling assets such as attack helicopters. I totally endorse this view! It is recommended that the entire helicopter fleet including attack as well as medium and heavy helicopters including the Chinook be transferred to the Army at the earliest for optimal utilisation of this critical resource as is the case with other advanced armies of the world including those in our neighbourhood.
Boeing CH-47 Chinook of the IAF (Photo: Angad Singh)
Prototype of HAL light utility helicopter (LUH) (image HAL)
It would be appropriate to reiterate here that Army Aviation today has a permanent cadre of its own, which includes pilots, technicians and support/administrative staff. Officers are now directly commissioned into the Army Aviation Corps after completing their training and affiliated to different infantry battalions located in operational areas for the first two years of service, where they learn, imbibe and understand the essence of ‘Army Culture’, a pre-requisite for becoming an Army Aviation Aviator. This indeed is the fundamental of Army’s Aviation Culture which unfortunately the Air Force and some of their fellow travellers do not - or cannot - understand.
Raison d’etre
Primary role of attack helicopters the world over is to support and fight the land battle in the tactical domain. A key element of attack helicopter employment philosophy is that they must operate as part of the combined arms team–and not in isolation. Such a situation was dramatically demonstrated during the 2003 Iraq war when a deep strike raid attempt by a large number of US Apaches against an Iraqi Armoured Division near Karbala failed miserably, with consequential high losses. However, the same Apaches were successful in a similar mission four days later, when their operations were conducted in close coordination with the ground forces, artillery, as also ground attack aircraft. The employment of attack helicopters, fully integrated with Army Aviation units and fighting alongside – and above – the Infantry also gives a new meaning to close air support in the TBA and which brings into focus the role of attack and armed helicopters. In Afghanistan, troops on the ground have been more comfortable with intimate support provided by attack helicopters in their operations, thanks to the visibility, proximity and short response time factors.
The shapes to come
In the near future, the Indian Army’s Aviation Corps will have a formidable attack helicopter inventory, from the Rudra armed helicopter to the Apache and the LCH. Th e LCH particularly, because of its high altitude capability will be a force multiplier and major weapon of decision in any future conflict in the high mountains. Further, as per the recent reorganisation and concept of lean and mean Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) whose operations have been validated both in the mountains and plains, these will need dedicated and organic fire support elements in terms of rapidly helilifted artillery as well as attack helicopters. The Boeing AH-64E Apache is a game changer and will be a powerful and decisive factor for the Strike Corps Commander: in case of a future confl ict, the 22 Apaches presently with the Air Force must also be immediately available to support land forces operations, which is the primary role of these attack helicopters (not as anti-drone interceptors as some men in blue proclaim!). I quote a very relevant paragraph from the joint memorandum issued by the US Army and US Air Force to the House Armed Services Committee in April 1976 to define the role of attack helicopters – this was at a time when the two Services were also going through similar ownership issues: ‘The attack helicopter is a mobile weapon system capable of providing organic fire support to local Army units. Because of the limited range, speed and firepower of the attack helicopter, as compared with Air Force fixed-wing close support capabilities, we do not consider the attack helicopter as duplicating Air force close air support’. This should put to rest any further discussion on the ownership issue of attack helicopters: as with the US military, the same needs to be done for the Indian military without further procrastination or delay.
HAL light combat helicopter (image: HAL)
HAL light combat helicopter in Ladakh (photo: HAL)
Boeing AH-64E Apache (photo: Boeing)
Lt Gen BS Pawar is an alumnus of the RIMC at Dehra Dun, and has, during his career of over four decades, held a number of important command and staff appointments. He was head of the Army Aviation Corps and Commandant School of Artillery. Currently, he is President of the Northern Region of The Helicopter Society of India.