Sanjay Badri-Maharaj reviews the Indian Air Force’s declining squadron strength

Options and Challenges

At a meeting of the Parliamentary Consultative Committee of Defence on 27 October 2017, senior officers of the Indian Air Force, including then Vice Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal SB Deo, were reportedly rebuked by Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman for “inappropriate responses” to the issue of declining squadron strength. It has been reported that the Indian Air Force virtually rehashed long standing issues of its depleting combat strength without offering any credible options. Besides being somewhat tiresome for the aforementioned Committee – having undoubtedly heard the same refrain for some time – the lack of solutions being offered is somewhat surprising considering that a number of steps are currently being considered to address the declining force levels. What is perhaps more serious is that some of these steps are being pursued in somewhat half-hearted manner, which is not attributable to lack of budgetary support.

The IAF has recently issued another RFI for multi-role combat aircraft and the same six companies have responded offering with the MiG-35, the Rafale, the Typhoon, the Gripen, the Lockheed-Martin F-16 and the Boeing F/A-18. Each parent company has reportedly tied-up with a local partner for the 110 aircraft in contention. Given the dreary history of fighter procurement in India, it is an open question as to whether this project too will produce any desired results.

The Current Situation

HAL-built Sukhoi Su-30MKI

 The Indian Air Force has an effective strength of 31 combat squadrons, which includes eleven squadrons of the Su-30MKI, three each of the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000 (currently undergoing an upgrade), six of the Jaguar (at the initial stage of an upgrade process) and seven of the MiG-21 variants. In addition, two upgraded MiG-27 squadrons continue to serve alongside the equivalent of half a squadron with the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment (TACDE).  It is to be noted that in early in the 21^st century, peak strength of the Indian Air Force was approximately 39.5 combat squadrons, with four MiG-23MF/-BN and six MiG-27ML squadrons forming core of the strike assets and some seventeen MiG-21 FL/M/MF/bis squadrons forming bulk of the air defence force. These were complemented by Jaguar, Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 squadrons, which added a high-technology cutting edge to an otherwise mediocre inventory. Since then, the MiG-21 and MiG-27 squadrons have been in decline and the MiG-23s phased out completely.

MiG-21bisons at an operational fighter base

The Challenge

Tejas LCA Mk.I at high altitude trials in Leh

The IAF desires a strength of some 42 combat squadrons by the period 2027-32 to meet the contingencies of a two-front war.  Assuming today’s strength of 31 squadrons – discounting the Tejas squadron that is still to reach its desired strength – there is an immediate requirement for 11 more to meet desired force levels by 2027. Currently three more Su-30MKI and two Dassault Rafale squadrons are in the pipeline with two squadrons of Tejas Mk.1 fighters supplementing   them. All these will add some seven squadrons for the IAF. However, all squadrons of MiG-21 variants and the two MiG-27UPG will be phased out by 2022. If no new aircraft are ordered, it is possible that the IAF would be left with 30 combat squadrons by 2022 – an overall deficiency of 12 squadrons when set against its desired strength. Subsequently, one Jaguar squadron is due to be retired by 2027, which would mean an overall deficiency of 13 squadrons by 2027.

Although making up this shortfall by 2027 poses significant challenges, the IAF is not without options. It had planned to acquire an additional four squadrons of Rafales and undoubtedly would still like to do so if permitted. To compensate for this shortfall and to cater for future replacements for aircraft such as the Jaguar and eventually the MiG-29 and Mirage 2000, there could be two active plans to bolster force levels. One of these involves the procurement of 110 new fighters, as per the RFI. The other involves procurement of 83 LCA Mk.1A (plus 40 LCA Mk.1s).  

MMRCA 2.0?

In the RFI referred to above, bulk of the fighters would be procured under the ‘Make in India’ programme. The F-16, the Gripen, the F/A-18 and the Rafale will sensibly compete for selection. Of note is the plan for the aircraft to be built or assembled as part of an initiative through ‘strategic partnerships’ with the private sector. Lockheed-Martin has forged a partnership with Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL), Saab with the Adani Group, Boeing with Mahindra/HAL and Dassault with the Reliance Group. But none of these Indian partners have significant experience in manufacturing aircraft (or their avionics) to date. This may be a stumbling point as per the original MMRCA concept there was unwillingness of Dassault to be responsible for aircraft manufactured by HAL. Would it now be possible to hold OEMs responsible for aircraft manufactured in India ? 

While India’s selection of new fighters will depend on capabilities offered as also technology transfer and cost-effectiveness, there is virtual equivalence of performance among the types under review. All of them are multi-role aircraft with good manoeuvrability and adequate capabilities in all aspects of air-to-air and air-to-ground combat. The choice, therefore, should be on the basis of the ‘package’ offered rather than individual aircraft specifications since the aircraft on offer are very similar. Yet, despite the claims of the respective companies, establishing production lines and delivering aircraft will inevitably take their time, making quick availability of new aircraft unlikely. 

The delay in decision making, now also complicated by a political row that has created much noise, but not produced proof of wrong-doing, still has the potential to stymie procurement efforts and thus preclude any timely decisions. Indeed, logically, if India is willing to eschew the ‘Make in India’ requirement, then the direct import of 90 additional Rafales would be the most sensible way forward. Even in terms of cost, with license-production invariably adding to unit costs, there may be advantages in this approach. 

Is there a seventh contender for MMRCA 2.0 ? In the shape of more Su-30MKIs ? It is understood that HAL has made an offer to manufacture 40-50 more Su-30MKIs for the IAF. Given the fact that HAL has already spent vast resources and expended great efforts to indigenise the Su-30MKI and is now seeking local LRU manufacture on a large scale, the HAL-Sukhoi option may become very attractive.

The LCA  : Delays and lack of focus

Tejas LCA Mk.I with No.45 Squadron 

On 1 July 2016, No.45 Squadron inducted the first two series production Tejas Mk.1 Light Combat Aircraft. Nearly 18 months have elapsed since these first aircraft were inducted and they have since now been joined by some half dozen more. Built to IOC (Initial Operational Clearance) standards, these aircraft are the first of twenty destined for No. 45 squadron, while an additional 20 will be built to FOC standard, where steady but somewhat slow progress is being made. 

On 12 May 2017, the Tejas Mk.1 crossed a major milestone when aircraft LSP-4 successfully fired a Derby Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missile and this has now been cleared for integration. While gun trials were scheduled to commence last year, they have now been delayed owing to some shift in priorities. In-flight refuelling trials are currently being conducted and the FOC subsequently delayed to 2019. Meanwhile, as performance of the six Tejas aircraft during Exercise Gaganshakti in 2018 was “most impressive” according to IAF sources. 

However, of great concern is the continuing slow rate of production by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). HAL is not yet able to meet the target of eight aircraft per year, much less the enhanced production target of 16 aircraft per year. Despite establishing a second production line  using HAL’s erstwhile BAE Hawk production facility, there has been very slow rate of progress in increasing production rate of the Tejas.  These delays on the part of HAL have adversely impacted unit establishment of No.45 Squadron as a viable operational entity which continues to operate with only ten aircraft.

Still, even with its limited IOC configuration, the Tejas Mk.1 offers considerable capability. Air defence is taken care of by the R-73 and Derby missiles and the aircraft is also cleared for delivery of guided and unguided air-to-ground ordnance. An armament exercise was successfully conducted by No. 45 Squadron in September-October 2017, apparently with good results, which augurs well for the acceptance of the Tejas as a front-line aircraft, its performance proven during Exercise Gaganshakti.

On 8 November 2016, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) cleared the production of 83 Tejas Mk.1A aircraft, designed to correct many of the existing shortcomings in the Mk.I (FOC) aircraft. The Tejas Mk.1A is to be equipped with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and electronic warfare systems not integrated in the earlier LCA Mk.1s.  However, DAC clearance is not the same as a contract – hardly surprising since the avionics fit still awaits  decisions from HAL despite a tender being floated for AESA radars and jamming pods. On 5 October 2017, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa spoke of shortly “issuing the “RFP for 83 more LCAs”, indicating a disconnect or at the very least poor communications between HAL and the IAF. The high cost of the Tejas Mk1A has attracted adverse attention, some reports having it that this aircraft costs more than the twin-engined fighter, which is more than twice its size and weight !

Despite HAL being lead agency for the Tejas Mk.1A, it has not accorded this project sufficient priority despite it offering HAL the opportunity to be part of the design and development of an indigenous aircraft. The proposed LCA Mk.II, with a new GE.414 engine, is a projected development of the type, but, to date, work has been minimal. To be fair, it has been suggested that the reason for the failure to select the radar/ electronic warfare package for the Mk.1A may well be due to the preferred supplier escalating costs to an unacceptable level.

Still, the Tejas, especially its Mk.1A variant, offers an opportunity for the IAF to reduce its squadron strength shortfall. Unlike the proposed fighter procurement projects, this is an endeavour that, despite very long delays, has borne some fruit and is at the cusp of making a viable, relatively low-cost, replacement for the MiG-21 available to the Indian Air Force. If HAL were to treat the Mk.1A as priority and the IAF and ADA take the necessary steps to complete the FOC of the basic Mk.1 without further delays and shifting priorities, then there is a possibility of two Tejas Mk.1 and four Tejas Mk.1A squadrons being in service by 2025, thus filling the gap left, by the retirement of the remaining seven MiG-21 squadrons. If the LCA Mk.II is sanctioned and developed with alacrity, then the prospect for additional squadrons is in the offing, also for replacing aircraft such as the upgraded MiG-29 and some Jaguars and Mirage 2000s by 2032.

The Options

LCA in flight display during an Aero India Show 

Future procurement invariably has to contend with the none-too-generous capital budget allocated to the IAF. It is public knowledge that the IAF needs to induct no fewer than 12 combat squadrons to meet its targeted strength by 2027-32.  As the very first step, it is suggested that full support for the Tejas Mk.1A project be given by all stakeholders : Government, ADA, HAL and the IAF. This would make available four new squadrons to the IAF by 2025, with the prospect of additional aircraft if the LCA Mk.II is funded and developed through necessary redesign of the airframe. Lack of focus and priority has been bane of the LCAs project in recent years rather than technical shortcomings in the aircraft or technological hurdles. HAL’s somewhat lackadaisical approach on the production of Tejas Mk.1 has to end. Indeed, while the Mk.1A takes shape, more rapid manufacture by HAL could encourage the production of an additional 20 FOC Mk.1s to keep production lines going until the Mk1A emerges. This would be a low-risk option that offers significant advantages for the IAF.

HAL-built Sukhoi Su-30MKI

The second option that needs to be considered – and with alacrity – is HAL’s offer of 40 or more Su-30MKIs. Indeed, one might wish to consider as many as 80 new aircraft plus 8 additional aircraft to compensate for attrition losses to date. As there are also plans for an upgrade of the Su-30MKI, a combination of 80 new plus upgrades would go a long way to meeting the IAF’s fighter needs well beyond 2032.

As for meeting the requirement for single-engine multi-role aircraft, the IAF and GOI may well wish to consider the procurement of second-hand Mirage 2000s from Qatar and France. This is obviously not ideal but the Mirage 2000 has served the IAF exceedingly well and in its upgraded form may serve for decades. It therefore behoves the IAF to put aside false pride and examine this option of obtaining such Mirage 2000s. This option has the advantage of inducting aircraft familiar to IAF pilots and which already use compatible ordnance.

Indian Air Force operates three squadrons of Mirage 2000s, its truly only multi-role combat aircraft at present

Above all, the GOI must show some courage. The current Rafale ructions appear to be bereft of sense, factual basis or logic. Timidity is the worst path to follow and runs the risk of crippling the entire arms procurement procedures. Either the GOI makes a decision quickly on a ‘Make in India’ fighter project or it abandons the entire thing and opts for the most sensible way forward : the direct import of 90 more Rafales. 

Dassault Rafale in French Air Force service

The IAF is, therefore, not without options, all of which are currently at some stage of realisation. What is lacking is a sense of urgency on part of all the parties concerned. The IAF is faced with severe shortfall in its combat squadron strength by 2022. The path to avoiding this situation is open to various solutions. It is up to the Government and the IAF to take necessary decisions in timely manner and ensure that existing projects are taken to their conclusion and simultaneously new procurement endeavours are supported in expeditious manner.