
Saab Gripen E (Photo: Saab)

Dassault Rafale (Photo: Dassault)
In the sixties and seventies, the IAF, with its superior capability, played a pivotal role in dominating the battlefield and changing the course of war in India’s favour. Then, in the eighties, it went through an evolution in terms of both enhanced operational capabilities and squadron strength. The quick inductions of Mirage-2000, Jaguar, MiG-29, MiG- 23, MiG-27, and MiG-25 saw a rapid enhancement in strength. At the same time, HAL manufactured the last of the MiG-21 series, the “Bis”, which in coming decades would go through extensive modernisation to be the “Bison”. But that advantage quickly started to dwindle as several platforms got obsolete, requiring immediate replacement. Dassault Aviation reportedly offered to transfer production line of Mirage-2000 to India. But ultimately there was no progress. At that time, IAF squadron strength plummeted to an all-time low of just 32 squadrons! To combat this, the IAF issued a RFI in 2001 for the procurement of 126 multi-role fighter jets. Yes! It is that old.
And it started (2007)

Lockheed Martin F21 (Photo: LM)
On 28 August 2007, the Request for Proposal (RFP) for the procurement at an estimated cost of Rs. 42,000 crores (then $10.4 billion) for the Indian Air Force was issued to six vendors. These six participants were MiG-35 (RAC MiG of Russia), JAS- 39 Gripen NG (SAAB of Sweden), Rafale (Dassault of France), F-16IN Super Viper (Lockheed Martin of the US) F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (Boeing of the US) and Eurofighter Typhoon (Airbus, a consortium of British, German, Spanish and Italian firms). The entire procedure was envisioned as follows: First, the proposals from the contenders would be technically evaluated to check for compliance with operational requirements and RFP conditions by the IAF. Then extensive field trials would be carried out to evaluate the performance. Then eligible vendors will be short-listed after technical and field evaluations. Finally, the commercial proposals of the vendors would be examined and compared. It was decided that the first 18 aircraft would come in a “fly away” condition while the remaining 108 would be manufactured under the Transfer of Technology (ToT). There was an obligation to undertake a 50% offset in India by the selected vendor. It had been hoped that the ToT and offset contracts would provide a great technological and economic boost to the indigenous defence industries. The aircraft were to serve over 40 years. The requirements were not made public. However, in an interview in 2007, then Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal F.H. Major stated, “We want the aircraft to have an adequate long-range and endurance to meet our operational requirements with additional mid-air refueling capability, ease of maintenance and low life-cycle costs.” In the same year, according to a report, the RFP specified an option to go in for an additional 60- 65 more jets if required. He debunked rumours of multi-vendor acquisition. This acquisition procedure under Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) 2006 was laid down in August 2007 with the issuance of the RFP. The first squadron was expected to be ready by 2012.
Days of all-out war (2008–2011)
The technical bids were thoroughly evaluated in 2008, followed by grueling field trials in 2009 in Bengaluru, Jaisalmer, and Leh. Thus, the full potential of the competing platforms was evaluated by subjecting them to extreme adverse weather conditions such as humidity, scorching desert heat and blistering cold at high altitude. At the end of August 2009, ACM P.V. Naik informed the media that the trials of the F-16, F/A-18, Rafale, and MiG-35 had been completed. According to reports, by May 2010, all contenders had completed their trials. All platforms vying for the competition had to conduct various combat maneuvers, air-toair refueling, dummy weapon firing, and so on. Interesting was the high-altitude trial where one had to land, refuel, and take-off again. The media reported that though the weapon tests in Pokhran went smoothly, a few platforms faced problems restarting their engines amidst the rarefied atmosphere of Leh. The technical evaluation report of the tests was mentioned as “virtually ready” by July and it was all set for the staff evaluation followed by assessment of commercial bids by contenders. For the first time commercial evaluation were to be determined by the “life-cycle cost”. It would incorporate cost of acquisition, cost for operating cost the fighter for a 40-year period with 6,000 flying hours and cost of ToT. 50% offset was also mentioned in the contract, under which the contender had to invest half of the contract forex value back to India! It was a highly complex affair indeed. In December that year, ACM P.V. Naik informed him about the completion of the evaluation. Addressing several subjects, he hoped for the signing of the deal by July of 2011 and delivery by 2014. At the end of April 2011, four of the six contenders were officially ruled out of the fray, leaving only Dassault and Airbus. The disappointed American contenders wasted no time and rushed to understand the reason. The uneasiness was sorted out by a government-to-government debriefing between Indian and US officials. On 4 November the final bids were opened.
And it’s Dassault (2012-2014)
It was 31 January and 1 February 2012. Multiple reports confirming the win from Dassault took the world by storm. The decision irritated the United Kingdom the most, prompting harsh criticism in British media. But the IAF vociferously rubbished all this nonsense. To ease the situation, the External Affairs Ministry (EAM) briefed the defeated party of the European consortium as well.
Axed: Mother of All Deals (2014)
In February 2014 the Defence Minister A.K. Antony revealed the reason behind deferring the finalization of the deal to procure 126 multi-role fighter jets as the lack of necessary financial capability! The deal then stood at est. more than Rs. 60,000 crores overwhelmingly overran the original estimation of Rs. 42,000 crores in 2007. Referring the procurement as the “mother of all deals”, the defence minister was further quoted saying “there is no money left for this” and pushed the deal for the next government. Meanwhile many analysts estimated the overall cost would sky rocket to more than $20 billion! As general election in 2014 knocked at door more log jam hit the deal regarding work share and responsibility issues. HAL and Dassault continued industrial coordination with HAL taking responsibility of directing 70% of the work in India. Concerns over life cycle cost kept hammering the negotiation process. On 8 August 2014, the MoD, under the new Defence Minister Arun Jaitley, officially stated, “The 18 direct-flyaway aircraft are expected to be delivered in three to four years from the signing of the contract. The remaining 108 licensed aircraft in India are expected to be delivered during the next seven years”. The new Defence Minister, Manohar Parrikar, in December gave assurance that he would resolve the issue in a fast-tracked manner. But ultimately, both parties would be bogged down in interminable discussions.
G2G (2015)
In 2015, during the Paris tour, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 10 April announced a new deal to procure 36 Rafale’s in flyway condition, citing critical operational requirements of the IAF. At a joint press conference with French President Francois Hollande, the procurement was announced under a government-togovernment deal. The same year, the government pulled the rug on the 126 MMRCAs. On 31 July 31 2015, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar told the Rajya Sabha, “The Request for Proposal (RFP) issued earlier for the procurement of 126 MMRCA has been withdrawn.” The next year, French President Francois Hollande was invited as the chief guest on the occasion of Republic Day. Both nations inked a MoU on the purchase of 36 Rafales. India finally signed the deal with France on 23 September 2016, at a reported cost of 7.8 billion euros. It was inked in New Delhi between Indian defence minister Manohar Parrikar and his French counterpart, Jean Yves Le Drian. On 8 October 2019, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh inducted the first Rafale F3R into the Indian Air Force. There were 13 Indian-specific Enhancements (ISEs) on the Indian Rafale. The deal irked many and led towards a lot of controversies and slugfest involving various parties raising questions regarding various aspects of the contract. After many ups and downs, at the end the Supreme Court gave a clear verdict. The MoD would give official statement, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment dated 14 November 2019 has categorically stated that the Review Petitions are without any merit and are dismissed.” Further discussion on it is unnecessary as our subject focuses on only the process of the project.

Boeing F-18 Super Hornet (Photo: Boeing)

MiG-35 (Photo: Rosoboronexport)
A single engine contest (2016-2018)
In 2016, India reinitiated the global contest for a medium multi-role fighter, but this time only for a single engine! Thus, it automatically narrowed down the competition to only two contenders: Lockheed Martin and Saab. LM was already pushing its offer through the Indo-US Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI). The F-16 production line was offered to be shifted to India. Saab offered to help with the LCA programme and the development of the Tejas “Mk.1A” as well as the AMCA fifth-generation fighter jet! It quickly became a contest between the F-16 Block 70 and the Gripen E. In early January of 2017, Raksha Mantri Manohar Parrikar said that a new line of production for single-engine fighter jets in India would be approached under the Strategic Partnership model. This discussion was to be concluded by the end of that month itself. But it hit the corner at the end.
2018-2022

Eurofighter Typhoon (Photo: Bundeswehr/Dahmen)
As complexities arose in single-engine conditions, the government scrapped that in February 2018. On 6 April, the IAF released another RFI for the procurement of 110 multi-role platforms, of which 85% were to be made in India by a strategic partner. At that time, the squadron strength further went down to just 31! The cost of the project was estimated at $15 billion. At a press conference just days before his retirement, Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha said the 36 Rafale jets bought by India were not enough and more aircraft were needed in the medium weight category. He also said that India needed at least 200 more fighter aircraft in the next ten years.
New Players
Lockheed Martin positioned the F-21 as the most advanced variant and evolution of the F-16.They even offered a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facility in India to sweeten the bid. Boeing is mulling offering the F-15EX, the latest upgraded variant of the F-15 series. Other than these two, all the old players (F/A-18E, Gripen E, Su-35, MiG-35, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Rafale) remain in the game.
Current Status
n 2020 the entire stage was at the RFI evaluation stage. The entire process was shifted from ‘Strategic Partnership’ to ‘Buy Global, Make in India’ under under Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020. The selected OEM will have to comply with the requirements of ToT. The last update on it came from current (2022) CAS ACM V.R. Chaudhari who confirmed the progress on MRFA. Expect some new development during Defexpo 2022. The quest for an advanced multirole fighter to be manufactured in India originally dates back to the 80s! To combat Pakistan’s acquisition of the F-16, which at that time was undoubtedly a game changer, the IAF procured Mirage 2000s from France and MiG-29s from the USSR. But for various reasons, the IAF abandoned the original plan to manufacture either of them on Indian soil. Then came the twenty-first century. And it’s just gobsmacking that a decision has not materialised since 2001! It has already been 20 years since India’s quest for MRFA type aircraft and the country cannot afford to wait any longer. Chinese military strength is growing rapidly. And Pakistan too, leaves no stone unturned to modernise itself. In the end, we can just hope for a final decision as early as possible.

Article by Sankalan Chattopadhyay (Twitter @vinoddx9)